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The use of natural resources has improved living conditions for many people on
this planet. Consequently, the question of how natural resources should be man-
aged over time is of great importance. Hotelling’s (1931) and Herfindahl’s (1967)
work provide basic implications for the price development and optimal extraction of
nonrenewable resources. The models are based on several simplifying assumptions
including the absence of technological change (Krautkraemer, 1998). Progress in
extraction technology, however, has turned out to play a decisive role. One exam-
ple is the recent U.S. shale gas boom where technological innovations in horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing have enabled the large-scale production of natural
gas from shale formations that were so far considered to be uneconomical (Joskow,
2015; Mason et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2014).
Despite the economic benefits that the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels
provides (e.g. Kinnaman, 2011; Paredes et al., 2015; Weber, 2012), it has left cur-
rent and future generations with one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century.
The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere causes global mean tem-
perature to rise (IPCC, 2013), leading to potentially severe impacts on economies,
ecosystems and species worldwide (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016; Hoegh-Guldberg
and Bruno, 2010; Urban, 2015). Although most countries acknowledge the need
for cooperation (UN, 1992), it has proven difficult to achieve stable international
agreements (Nordhaus, 2015). Free-riding incentives have led to the concern that
worldwide abatement efforts might not be sufficient to limit the increase in global
mean temperature to well below 2◦C in accordance with the Paris Agreement (Field
and Mach, 2017; Lawrence et al., 2018).
Recently, alternative measures to address global warming have gathered atten-
tion. Climate engineering, or geoengineering, has been proposed as a means to
counteract increasing temperatures by either intentionally interfering in the earth’s
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solar radiation budget or the large-scale removal of carbon dioxide from the atmo-
sphere (Crutzen, 2006; Heutel et al., 2016; Keith and MacMartin, 2015; Klepper
and Rickels, 2014; Lawrence et al., 2018; Rickels et al., 2018). The deployment of
geoengineering technologies is, however, subject to many uncertainties, and poten-
tial side-effects (Field and Mach, 2017; Fuss et al., 2014; McMartin et al., 2016;
Robock, 2008).
This cumulative thesis consists of three individual research articles and primar-
ily contributes to the environmental and resource economics literature. The second
chapter studies the recent U.S. shale gas boom by introducing endogenous techno-
logical progress in a Hotelling-Herfindahl model of resource extraction. The third
and fourth chapters investigate the economic implications of two climate engineer-
ing measures, stratospheric aerosol injections and carbon dioxide removal, based on
the recently emerging literature on analytic integrated assessment models (Gerlagh
and Lsiki, 2018; Golosov et al., 2014; Traeger, 2018). In the following, I briefly
introduce each chapter separately and emphasize my own contribution.
The second chapter is titled “Booming gas – A theory of endogenous tech-
nological change in resource extraction” . Motivated by the recent U.S. shale
gas boom, the article aims to improve the understanding of endogenous technologi-
cal change in models of resource extraction. We introduce optimal forward-looking
technology investments in a standard Hotelling-Herfindahl model, and study the
implications for price development and optimal order of resource extraction. Fur-
ther, we analyze how the introduction of a carbon tax affects the timing of the
shale gas boom. Results show that technology investments increase during the ex-
traction of conventional gas, and start to decrease once production shifts towards
shale gas. Consistent with current trends, the theory explains how gas prices can
follow a U-shaped path. We show that the introduction of a carbon tax could dras-
tically change the temporal patterns of shale gas extraction. The forward-looking
behaviour of firms is crucial for such an effect, which does not occur in models that
2
treat the improvement in extraction technology as an unanticipated shock to the
industry.
The second chapter is joint work with my supervisor Martin Quaas, and has been
submitted to the “Journal of Environmental Economics and Management” (cur-
rent status: Revise & resubmit). The paper benefited from comments by Hassan
Benchekroun, the audiences at WCNRM 2020, VfS-Conference 2019, WCERE 2018,
and the participants at the Green-Econ Spring School 2018 at AMSE. I have con-
tributed substantially to this paper during all major stages of the research process,
including the literature review, the development of the resource economic model,
the calibration of the model to the U.S. natural gas industry, and the quantitative
analysis.
The third chapter is titled “Solar geoengineering and strategic interac-
tions in a regional analytic climate economy” . The article introduces the
option of stratospheric sulfur injections into the Analytic Climate Economy (ACE)
model from Traeger (2018). For this purpose, we derive a new class of solutions
to analytic Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) that allows us to solve an IAM
with sulfur-based geoengineering and damages in closed-form, and to model realistic
strategic interactions between two active regions, and a passive rest of the world.
We analyze the resulting Markov game, and derive analytic solutions for the Social
Cost of Carbon (SCC). The model suggests a globally optimal sulfur deployment
strategy that increases linearly in the atmospheric carbon concentration, as well as a
high sensitivity of geoengineering measures to potential damages. Current damage
guesstimates suggest that solar geoengineering could reduce the SCC of a global so-
cial planner by 12-22%. The regional SCC can both increase or decrease depending
on the heterogeneity of climate and geoengineering damages across regions.
The third chapter is joint work with Christian Traeger. The paper benefited from
discussions with Martin Quaas and comments at EAERE 2019, Toulouse Conference
on The Economics of Energy and Climate 2019, and the ASSA meeting 2020. I
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have contributed substantially to this paper during all major stages of the research
process, including the literature review, the development of the global and regional
model, and the discussion of the results.
The fourth chapter is titled “Carbon dioxide removal in a global analytic
climate economy” . The paper introduces the option of Carbon Dioxide Removal
(CDR) and storage in different reservoir types into an analytic integrated assessment
model of climate change. It derives the optimal level of CDR deployment, and
analyzes the implications for traditional carbon dioxide mitigation incentives. I
show that the introduction of CDR lowers net energy input and net emissions
over the entire time path. Furthermore, CDR affects the SCC via changes in total
economic output but leaves the analytic structure of the SCC unchanged. The SCC
is first lower and then higher compared to a standard climate-economy model. CDR
leads to higher emissions in the first years and lower emissions in the later years.
The quantitative analysis implies that the effect of CDR on the SCC is minor, and
that CDR is needed on top of traditional mitigation efforts.
The fourth chapter is single-authored but benefited from comments and discus-
sions with Martin Quaas, Wilfried Rickels, Christian Traeger, and Jasper Meya.
4
References
Aguilera, Roberto F and Radetzki, Marian. The shale revolution: Global gas and
oil markets under transformation. Mineral Economics, 26(3):75–84, 2014.
Carleton, Tamma A and Hsiang, Solomon M. Social and economic impacts of cli-
mate. Science, 353(6304), 2016.
Crutzen, Paul J. Albedo enhancement by stratospheric sulfur injections: A contri-
bution to resolve a policy dilemma? Climatic Change, 77(3-4):211–219, 2006.
Field, Christopher B and Mach, Katharine J. Rightsizing carbon dioxide removal.
Science, 356(6339):706–707, 2017.
Fuss, Sabine; Canadell, Josep G; Peters, Glen P; Tavoni, Massimo; Andrew, Rob-
bie M; Ciais, Philippe; Jackson, Robert B; Jones, Chris D; Kraxner, Florian;
Nakicenovic, Nebosja, and others. Betting on negative emissions. Nature Climate
Change, 4(10):850–853, 2014.
Gerlagh, Reyer and Liski, Matti. Consistent climate policies. Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, 16(1):1–44, 2018.
Golosov, Mikhail; Hassler, John; Krusell, Per, and Tsyvinski, Aleh. Optimal Taxes
on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium. Econometrica, 82(1):41–88, 2014.
Herfindahl, Orris C. Depletion and economic theory. Extractive resources and tax-
ation, pages 63–90, 1967.
Heutel, Garth; Moreno-Cruz, Juan, and Ricke, Katharine. Climate engineering eco-
nomics. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 8:99–118, 2016.
Hoegh-Guldberg, Ove and Bruno, John F. The impact of climate change on the
world’s marine ecosystems. Science, 328(5985):1523–1528, 2010.
5
Hotelling, Harold. The economics of exhaustible resources. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 39(2):137–175, 1931.
IPCC, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2013: The
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2013.
Joskow, Paul L. The Shale Gas Revolution: Introduction. Economics of Energy and
Environmental Policy, 4(1), 2015.
Keith, David W and MacMartin, Douglas G. A temporary, moderate and responsive
scenario for solar geoengineering. Nature Climate Change, 5(3):201–206, 2015.
Kinnaman, Thomas C. The economic impact of shale gas extraction: A review of
existing studies. Ecological Economics, 70(7):1243–1249, 2011.
Klepper, Gernot and Rickels, Wilfried. Climate engineering: Economic considera-
tions and research challenges. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,
8(2):270–289, 2014.
Krautkraemer, Jeffrey A. Nonrenewable resource scarcity. Journal of Economic lit-
erature, 36(4):2065–2107, 1998.
Lawrence, Mark G; Schäfer, Stefan; Muri, Helene; Scott, Vivian; Oschlies, Andreas;
Vaughan, Naomi E; Boucher, Olivier; Schmidt, Hauke; Haywood, Jim, and Schef-
fran, Jürgen. Evaluating climate geoengineering proposals in the context of the
Paris Agreement temperature goals. Nature Communications, 9(1):3734, 2018.
Mason, Charles F; Muehlenbachs, Lucija A, and Olmstead, Sheila M. The economics
of shale gas development. Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ., 7(1):269–289, 2015.
6
MacMartin, Douglas G; Kravitz, Ben; Long, Jane CS, and Rasch, Philip J. Geo-
engineering with stratospheric aerosols: What do we not know after a decade of
research? Earth’s Future, 4(11):543–548, 2016.
Nordhaus, William. Climate clubs: Overcoming free-riding in international climate
policy. American Economic Review, 105(4):1339–70, 2015.
Traeger, Christian P. ACE - Analytic Climate Economy (with Temperature and
Uncertainty), 2018. URL https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307622.
Paredes, Dusan; Komarek, Timothy, and Loveridge, Scott. Income and employment
effects of shale gas extraction windfalls: Evidence from the Marcellus region.
Energy Economics, 47:112–120, 2015.
Rickels, Wilfried; Reith, Fabian; Keller, David; Oschlies, Andreas, and Quaas,
Martin F. Integrated assessment of carbon dioxide removal. Earth’s Future,
6(3):565–582, 2018.
Robock, Alan. 20 reasons why geoengineering may be a bad idea. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 64(2):14–18, 2008.
UN, United Nations. Agenda 21. 1992. URL https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf.
Urban, Mark C. Accelerating extinction risk from climate change. Science,
348(6234):571–573, 2015.
Wang, Qiang; Chen, Xi; Jha, Awadhesh N, and Rogers, Howard. Natural gas from
shale formation–the evolution, evidences and challenges of shale gas revolution in
United States. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 30:1–28, 2014.
Weber, Jeremy G. The effects of a natural gas boom on employment and income in
Colorado, Texas, and Wyoming. Energy Economics, 34(5):1580–1588, 2012.
7

2 Booming gas – A theory of endogenous
technological change in resource extraction
Felix D. Meier1,2 and Martin F. Quaas2,3
1Kiel Institute for the World Economy
2German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) Halle-Jena-Leipzig
3Department of Economics, Leipzig University
Abstract: This paper introduces endogenous technological change in a Hotelling-
Herfindahl model of natural resource use to study the recent developments in the
U.S. natural gas industry. We consider optimal forward-looking technology invest-
ments, and study implications for the order of extraction of conventional and shale
gas, and a backstop technology, and characterize the development of gas prices.
We find that technology investments increase during the extraction of conventional
gas. Once production shifts towards shale gas, investments decline. Consistent with
current trends, our theory explains how gas prices can follow a U-shaped path. The
calibrated model suggests that U.S. shale gas production continues to grow and
prices continue to decrease until 2050. We show that a carbon tax could drasti-
cally change the temporal patterns of shale gas extraction. The forward-looking
behaviour of firms is crucial for such an effect, which does not occur in models that
treat the improvement in extraction technology as an unanticipated shock to the
industry.
Keywords: shale gas, endogenous technological change, optimal order of extrac-
tion, natural gas prices, extraction costs, renewable backstop, optimal transition
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WCERE 2018 and the participants at the Green-Econ Workshop 2018 for valuable comments.
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2.1 Introduction
Resource booms have become a reoccurring phenomenon across the world, includ-
ing the natural gas and oil sector (Carter et al., 2011; Jacobsen and Parker, 2016).
However, the Hotelling-Herfindahl workhorse model of natural resource economics
is unable to explain this phenomenon of increasing resource use (Hotelling, 1931;
Herfindahl, 1967). This paper studies endogenous technological change as an im-
portant driver of resource booms. We propose a simple, novel resource-economic
theory that can explain the recent developments in the U.S. natural gas market.
Within the last decade, the U.S. has experienced a major shift in its energy
supply. From 2007 to 2018 the share of shale gas in total natural gas production
grew from 8 to 69 percent (EIA, 2019b, 2014). At the same time, overall natural gas
production increased by more than 50 percent and gas prices declined significantly
(EIA, 2018b,a).
These recent developments are not due to the exploration of new reserves. The
existence of abundant U.S. shale gas resources has been known for many years
(Newell et al., 2019; Asche et al., 2012). In 1821, the first well was drilled in
the Devonian Dunkirk Shale in Chautauqua County, New York. However, due to
low permeability, the extraction from shale formations was regarded as technically
difficult and not profitable. Consequently, production stayed on low levels for a
long time (Wang et al., 2014).
The two main technologies that have allowed for the large scale production of
shale gas in the early 21st century are hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.
Both technologies were developed by the natural gas and oil industry over decades.
Hydraulic fracturing was first used in the 1940s but its application was quite lim-
ited. Horizontal drilling was common in the natural gas industry by the late 1970s.
In the 1980s and 1990s, pioneering companies invested in the development of both
techniques with the goal to make the production of shale formations profitable.
10
It took until the turn of the century to reduce extraction costs sufficiently by fa-
cilitating a combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling as well as
new monitoring techniques using micro-seismic data (Aguilera and Radetzki, 2014;
Joskow, 2015, 2013; Mason et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2014).1 Although costs have
strongly declined, production started when average extraction costs of shale gas
were substantially higher than for conventional gas (Aguilera, 2014; IEA, 2013).2
The observation of increasing production and decreasing prices contradicts stan-
dard resource-economic theory. The classical model of Hotelling (1931) predicts
monotonically increasing prices and decreasing production over time. For the case
of multiple resource types, Herfindahl (1967) established the rule that deposits
should optimally be exploited in ascending order with respect to their marginal
extraction costs.
In this paper, we develop a novel variant of the Hotelling-Herfindahl model by
endogenizing progress in extraction technology for one type of resource (shale gas)
as a result of costly investments into research and development. We study the
consequences for price development and order of extraction when another resource
type (conventional gas) with mature extraction technology, or a renewable backstop
can be used as well. Our theory is not restricted to the natural gas industry, but can
also be applied to other exhaustible resources such as oil where similar technology
developments are taking place.
The above mentioned stylized facts indicate that the development of shale ex-
traction technology required continuous investments from natural gas and oil pro-
ducers over decades. Yet, empirical studies often base their identification strategy
on the assumption that the shale gas boom was an exogenous and unexpected shock
to the industry (e.g. Arezki et al., 2017; Wakamatsu and Aruga, 2013). Our model
1Shale formations contain natural gas and oil. The major technological innovations that have
made production profitable are similar for both resources (Joskow, 2015).
2Other countries have not yet shifted to the extensive use of shale gas resources. China,
for example, holds the world’s largest shale gas reserves but still lacks in advanced extraction
technologies (Lee and Sohn, 2014; Hu and Xu, 2013). China is expected to rise to the second
largest shale gas producer by 2040 (EIA, 2017a).
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puts this assumption in question, as it shows that the observed patterns of the shale
gas boom are fully consistent with forward-looking behavior of firms investing in
the development of extraction technology depending on expected future returns.
Our theory contributes to two strands of literature. First, we add to the litera-
ture that deals with the optimal order of resource extraction. This literature origins
with Herfindahl (1967) who shows that under the assumption of constant marginal
extraction costs, deposits with low costs should optimally be exploited first.
Various authors have set up more generalized models by relaxing different as-
sumptions of Herfindahl’s model (Kemp and Long, 1980; Lewis, 1982; Amigues et
al., 1998; Holland, 2003; Chakravorty et al., 2008; Chakravorty and Krulce, 1994;
Chakravorty et al., 2005; Gaudet et al., 2001; Gaudet and Lasserre, 2011; Gaudet
and Salant, 2016). This literature has shown that Herfindahl’s (1967) rule is part
of a more general principle, according to which deposits should optimally be ex-
tracted in sequence of their full marginal cost, i.e. marginal extraction cost plus
opportunity cost implied by the scarcity of the resource. This result has become
known as the Generalized Herfindahl Principle (Gaudet et al., 2001). We find that a
variant of the Generalized Herfindahl Principle also holds when taking endogenous
technological change into account, but that the shadow values of both resources
depend on the patterns of technological change.
Second, we contribute to the literature that tries to explain why prices of non-
renewable resources do not monotonically increase as implied by Hotelling (1931).
Economic theory offers two explanations for this. For many nonrenewable resources,
the discovery of additional deposits has exceeded extraction so that reserves have
actually increased (Adelman, 1990). Pindyck (1978) develops a model in which he
allows for the exploration of new reserves in the presence of stock dependent extrac-
tion costs. He shows that due to exploration, the price of a resource can follow a
U-shaped path. As U.S. shale gas resources have been known long before extraction
started, our model assumes that resource stocks are known from the beginning.
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The second explanation for declining prices is technological progress and its
decreasing effect on extraction costs. Slade (1982) adds exogenous technological
change to a Hotelling model and predicts a U-shaped relative price curve. Farzin
(1995) looks at exogenous technological change where marginal extraction costs de-
pend on cumulative production and current extraction rate. His model also shows
the possibility of a U-shaped price path. Lin and Wagner (2007) account for exoge-
nous technological change and stock dependent extraction costs. Their model allows
for a steady state solution and thus can explain constant prices over time. Rausser
(1974) develops a model of endogenous technological progress via learning by doing
in the extraction industry. As technological improvements come automatically with
resource extraction, the implications of the model for resource prices are similar as
the ones derived from the assumption of exogenous technological progress. Holland
(2008) summarizes different models of U-shaped price paths and points out that
modeling technological progress exogenously is insufficient as it leaves the main
point of interest unexplained.
Our paper addresses this gap in the literature and offers insights on how techno-
logical progress develops over time. We show that technology investments increase
during conventional gas extraction. Once production shifts completely towards
shale gas, investments decline. The technology stock evolves in a S-shaped fashion,
similar to the literature on technology diffusion (Davies, 1978; Jaffe and Stavins,
1994; Helm and Mier, 2019). Unlike Hotelling (1931), but consistent with current
trends, our theory explains how gas prices can follow a U-shaped path. Further,
we find that Herfindahl’s least-cost-first principle does no longer apply. Endoge-
nous technological progress allows for additional orders of resource extraction. In
particular, even if firms have already shifted to the use of the renewable backstop,
production can switch back to a nonrenewable resource for a period of time, when
extraction technology has sufficiently advanced. Our calibrated model suggests that
U.S. shale gas production continues to grow and prices continue to decrease until
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2050. We further find that the introduction of a carbon tax could have had a
strong postponing effect on the U.S. shale gas boom. This time-delaying effect crit-
ically depends on the forward-looking behaviour of producers, and does not occur in
models that threat the improvement in shale extraction technology as an exogenous
and unanticipated shock to the industry. For policy analysis it thus makes a big
difference whether technical progress is exogenous or endogenous.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we include endogenous technological
change in a standard Hotelling-Herfindahl model. Section 2.3 presents our proposi-
tions on technological progress, order of resource extraction, and price development.
In section 2.4, we calibrate the model to the U.S. natural gas industry. Section 2.5
considers two variations of the calibrated baseline model. The last section concludes.
2.2 Resource economic model
We consider the extraction of a homogeneous resource (natural gas) from two types
of deposits, S (shale gas) and C (conventional gas). The corresponding extraction
quantities are denoted by qs(t) ≥ 0 and qc(t) ≥ 0 at any point in time, t. In the
following, we omit the time dependency unless needed for clarity. Stocks S and C
of the two resources thus evolve according to
Ṡ = −qs, with S(0) > 0 given, (2.1)
Ċ = −qc, with C(0) > 0 given. (2.2)
Alternatively, consumers can use a renewable backstop at quantity qb(t) ≥ 0. All
three are perfect substitutes, such that gross consumer benefit can be written as
U(qs + qc + qb) =
∫ qs+qc+qb
0
P (j) dj, (2.3)
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where P (j) is the inverse demand for the resource with P ′(j) < 0. Marginal cost
for the backstop are constant and denoted by kb > 0. Extraction cost for deposit
type C, Kc(qc), are increasing and weakly convex in qc. The extraction technology
for deposit type C is assumed to be mature and fixed. Extraction cost for deposit
type S, by contrast, depend on the state of technology, Z(t), and are denoted by
Ks(qs, Z). Marginal extraction costs are positive and non-decreasing, Ksq > 0,
and Ksqq ≥ 0. Cost and marginal cost are decreasing with the state of technology,
KsZ < 0, and KsqZ < 0. Extraction cost and the marginal cost reduction from an
increase in the technology stock are zero, if there is no extraction from deposit type
S, Ks(0, Z) = 0, and KsZ(0, Z) = 0.
The state Z of the extraction technology for deposit type S can be improved by
technology investments, w(t) ≥ 0. Choosing units of measurement, the technology
stock evolves according to
Ż = w, with Z(0) ≥ 0 given. (2.4)
The cost of technology investments is given by L(w) with positive and increasing
marginal cost, L′(w) > 0, and L′′(w) > 0.
Competitive firms are assumed to maximize the present value of revenues minus






p (qs + qc + qb)−Ks(qs, Z)−Kc(qc)− kb qb − L(w)
]
e−δ t dt (2.5)
subject to (2.1), (2.2), and (2.4), and non-negativity constraints for all variables.
The discount rate is denoted by δ.
As in Pindyck (1984), market equilibrium requires that P (qs(t)+qc(t)+qb(t)) =
p(t) at each point in time. To guarantee an interior solution to the market equi-
librium conditions, we adopt the standard assumption that the difference between
consumer benefit and costs, W = U(qs+qc+qb)−Ks(qs, Z)−Kc(qc)−kb qb−L(w),
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is weakly concave in its arguments. In addition to the above-stated assumptions on
cost functions the weak concavity of W in qs and Z requires
(




s, Z)2 ≤ 0. (2.6)
Note that Condition 2.6 is always fulfilled for standard specifications of the extrac-









The shadow prices of the resource stocks are denoted by γ(t) for the shale gas
deposits and by λ(t) for the conventional gas deposits, and capture the current
value of an additional unit of resource in situ. The shadow price of the technology
stock is denoted by φ(t) and captures the current value of technological progress in
the shale gas industry.
With this notation, the optimality conditions for resource production and tech-
nology investment are given by
P (qs + qc + qb) = p ≤ Ksq (qs, Z) + γ, (2.7a)
P (qs + qc + qb) = p ≤ Kcq(qc) + λ, (2.7b)
P (qs + qc + qb) = p ≤ kb, (2.7c)
−L′(w) + φ ≤ 0, (2.7d)
where conditions hold with equality whenever the corresponding variable is positive
and with inequality if the non-negativity constraint is binding. In (2.7) we have
already inserted the market equilibrium condition that inverse demand P (·) is equal
to the supply price p of the resource.
Equations (2.7a), (2.7b), and (2.7c) state that the resource price should equal
the full marginal cost of the resource whenever a positive amount is used. The full
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marginal cost of each deposit type is characterized by marginal extraction cost plus
opportunity cost associated with the scarcity of the resource stock. Following the
literature, we define the sum of these costs as augmented marginal costs (AMCs(t)
for deposit type S and AMCc(t) for deposit type C). Equation (2.7d) shows that
investment in extraction technology is determined by the condition that marginal
cost of technology development should equal the shadow price of technology.
The dynamic optimality conditions require that the shadow prices γ and λ of
the two deposit types increase exponentially at the discount rate (Hotelling, 1931).
Using γ(0) = γ0 and λ(0) = λ0 to denote the – endogeneous – initial values of the
two shadow prices, the shadow prices at time t thus are
γ(t) = γ0 e
δ t, (2.8a)
λ(t) = λ0 e
δ t. (2.8b)
Extraction from a resource stock ends when either the deposit type has been ex-
hausted or its shadow value has turned to zero. As shadow prices are always positive,
both stocks will ultimately be exhausted.
The optimal development for the shadow price of technology is determined by





e−δ t φ(t)Z(t) = 0. (2.8d)
Equation (2.8c) shows very different dynamics for the shadow price of technology
for phases without extraction from deposit type S, i.e. when qs(t) = 0 and thus
KsZ(0, Z) = 0, and during phases with qs(t) > 0 and thus KsZ(qs, Z) < 0.
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2.3.1 Technological progress
The dynamics of technological progress in the shale gas industry depend on how the
marginal benefit of technology, −KsZ(qs, Z), develops over time. By assumption, it
is equal to zero if there is no resource extraction from deposit type S. If there is
resource extraction exclusively from deposit type S, it is decreasing over time.
Lemma 2.1. The marginal benefit of technology, −KsZ(qs, Z), monotonically de-
creases over time during a period of resource extraction exclusively from deposit
type S.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
The decline in the marginal benefit of technology results from a combination
of two effects: First, the technology stock may continue to grow if investment
stays positive during resource extraction, and this decreases the marginal benefit
of further technology improvements. Second, resource extraction may increase or
decrease over time, which tends to increase or decrease the marginal benefit of
technology. Due to discounting and the concavity of the objective function, the net
effect is towards decreasing marginal benefit of technology, under optimal resource
extraction, cf. Appendix A.1.1.
Lemma 2.1 allows us to characterize the dynamics of technological progress in
the period without and in the period with resource extraction exclusively from
deposit type S.
Proposition 2.1. Investment in extraction technology (weakly) monotonically in-
creases during a period without extraction from deposit type S, and (weakly) mono-
tonically decreases during a period with extraction exclusively from deposit type S.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
The proof of Proposition 2.1 utilizes the connection between optimal investment
and the shadow price of technology φ given by (2.7d). If this condition holds with
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. As L′′(w) > 0, there is
a monotonic relationship between w and φ. The growth rate of w, multiplied by
the elasticity of marginal investment cost, equals the growth rate of the shadow
price of technology. Accordingly, the statements in Proposition 2.1 hold with strict
monotonicity during a period where investment is positive.
During the period without shale gas extraction, (2.8c) implies φ̇ = δ φ. The
shadow price of technology increases over time at the rate of interest – provided
it is positive to begin with. Due to the monotonic relationship between w and φ,
investments increase over time as well and the technology stock grows in a convex
fashion, Z̈ = ẇ > 0. There are no revenues in the shale gas industry during this
period. However, producers already have an investment incentive since the present
value of investment is positive, φw − L(w) = L′(w)w − L(w) > 0.
In the period in which shale gas is the exclusive source of production, investment
declines and the technology function grows in a concave fashion, Z̈ = ẇ < 0. As the
shale gas stock approaches exhaustion, investment goes to zero since technological
progress becomes worthless.
Over the two periods, before shale gas is used and after deposit type S is used
exclusively, the technology stock develops over time in an S-shaped fashion, first
convex and then concave. This is a pattern familiar from the literature on technol-
ogy diffusion (Davies, 1978; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Helm and Mier, 2019).
2.3.2 Order of resource extraction
To obtain clear-cut statements about the temporal order of resource use, we assume
constant marginal costs of extraction for both resources,
Kc(qc) = kc qc,
Ks(qs, Z) = k(Z) qs.
(2.9)
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Under this assumption, only one type of resource will be used at each point in time,
as shown below. We return to the case of increasing marginal extraction costs in
the quantitative analysis of a calibrated version of the model in Section 2.4. The
general results on the order of resource extraction hold for the calibrated version as
well, but are blurred by phases of simultaneous resource extraction.
We focus on the relevant case in which unit extraction cost for both nonrenew-
able resources (may) be low enough to make them competitive to the backstop
technology, kc < kb and there exists some Z ≥ 0 such that k(Z) < kb for all Z ≥ Z.
We further assume a linear marginal investment cost function, i.e. that the




This assumption implies that the growth rate of investment is equal to the growth
rate of the shadow price of technology.3
The optimality conditions (2.7a), (2.7b), and (2.7c), with assumption (2.9), im-
ply that resources are used according to the Gerneralized Herfindahl Principle. Since
the resources are perfect substitutes, and marginal costs are constant by assump-
tion (2.9), optimality requires that only one resource will be used at a time. At each
point in time, this is the resource with the smallest augmented marginal cost. For
the backstop, the augmented marginal cost are equal to the constant marginal cost
of production, AMCb = kb. For shale and conventional gas, augmented marginal
cost is equal to the marginal cost of production plus the shadow price of the re-
source stock, AMCs = k(Z) + γ and AMCc = kc + λ. Thus, the decision whether
a resource type is produced or not is not only governed by the change in shadow
values over time but also by the dynamics of the technology stock.
3We assume that marginal investment cost is sufficiently small so that deposit type S will be
used. This is for example the case, when marginal cost is zero as investments are zero, L′(0) = 0.
Here, optimality condition (2.7d) always holds with equality since the shadow price of technology
is non-negative.
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Proposition 2.2. The only possible orders of resource extraction are the following:
(CSB) deposit type C → deposit type S → Backstop
(CBSB) deposit type C → Backstop → deposit type S → Backstop
(CSCB) deposit type C → deposit type S → deposit type C → Backstop
(SCB) deposit type S → deposit type C → Backstop
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
In Herfindahl (1967) producers first extract the deposit type with the highest
rent. In our model, this rule does not hold. Producers might start with the lower
rent deposit type since the rent from the higher rent deposit type cannot yet be
realized.
In Appendix A.1.3 we show that extraction order SCB from Proposition 2.2 can
only result, if λ0 < γ0. Since resource extraction follows the Generalized Herfindahl
Principle, SCB implies that the initial technology stock is high and k(Z(0)) < kc.
As this seems not to be a sensible assumption for shale gas, in the following we
focus on the first three extraction orders.
2.3.3 Price development
Investment decisions not only affect the optimal order of extraction but also price de-
velopment. Optimality requires that the resource price equals augmented marginal
costs for the type of deposit extracted. Hence, during the extraction of deposit type
C price monotonically increases over time as in Hotelling (1931),
ṗ = δ (p− kc) > 0 whenever qc > 0. (2.11)
During periods where the backstop is used, price stays constant, p = kb. In periods
where deposit type S is produced, price behavior depends on the technology stock,
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and develops according to
ṗ = δ (p− k(Z)) + k′(Z)w whenever qs > 0. (2.12)
There are two opposite effects on price development during shale gas extraction.
The first term represents the positive effect from the scarcity of the resource, just as
it is the case for extraction from deposit type C. The second term shows the effect
that technological progress reduces marginal extraction costs over time. This effect
may dominate the effect of increasing scarcity. Endogenous technological progress
in resource extraction may thus explain decreasing resource prices, and increasing
resource extraction, especially if the discount rate is low enough. We formally state
this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. (i) After a transition from extraction of deposit type C to ex-
traction of deposit type S, the resource price decreases if the discount rate is small
enough. (ii) After a transition from backstop to extraction of deposit type S, the
resource price decreases, irrespective of the discount rate.
Proof. (i) At the switch from C to S, p−k(Z) < kb. This is because price can never
be higher than the marginal cost of the backstop. In the limit of zero discounting,










k′(Z)w ≤ 0. (2.13)
By continuity, there exists an interval of positive discount rates where still ṗ < 0 at
the switch point between conventional and shale gas.
(ii) At the transition from backstop to deposit type S, price must be decreasing,
as otherwise it could not be optimal to switch away from the backstop.
Denoting by T s the time when extraction from deposit type S starts, by T s the
time when it ends, and by T b the time of the switch from C to B, we can summarize
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the price dynamics for the first three extraction orders from Proposition 2.2 as
follows:
CSB : p(t) =

AMCc(t) = λ0 e
δ t + kc, t ∈ [0, T s]
AMCs(t) = γ0 e
δ t + k(Z), t ∈ [T s, T s]
AMCb = kb, t ∈ [T s,∞]
(2.14a)
CBSB : p(t) =

AMCc(t) = λ0 e
δ t + kc, t ∈ [0, T b]
AMCb = kb, t ∈ [T b, T s]
AMCs(t) = γ0 e
δ t + k(Z), t ∈ [T s, T s]
AMCb = kb, t ∈ [T s,∞]
(2.14b)
CSCB : p(t) =

AMCc(t) = λ0 e
δ t + kc, t ∈ [0, T s]
AMCs(t) = γ0 e
δ t + k(Z), t ∈ [T s, T s]
AMCc(t) = λ0 e
δ t + kc, t ∈ [T s, T b]
AMCb = kb, t ∈ [T b,∞].
(2.14c)
During the extraction of deposit type C, price equals augmented marginal costs
of conventional gas and thus monotonically increases over time. Note that the initial
shadow values of deposit types C and S are endogenous and in general different
for extraction orders CSB, CBSB and CSCB. During the use of deposit type C,
technology investments increase over time and shale extraction technology is build
up at an increasing pace. In extraction order CSB, producers switch directly to
shale gas after conventional gas is depleted, and price follows augmented marginal
costs of shale gas (see 2.14a). In extraction order CBSB, the conventional deposit
type is depleted before shale gas becomes competitive and the market switches to
the renewable first. During the period in which the backstop is used, price stays
constant. Investments continue to increase and extraction costs of shale gas continue
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to decline. As augmented marginal costs become small enough, production finally
switches to shale gas (see 2.14b). In extraction order CSCB, the conventional
deposit type is not depleted as shale gas becomes competitive. Producers switch
back to deposit type C after deposit type S is used up (see 2.14c).
During the extraction of shale gas, production can increase and price can de-
crease for a period of time, especially if the discount rate is low enough (see Propo-
sition 2.3). Eventually, price must rise again since technological progress becomes
worthless as investments go to zero and deposit type S approaches exhaustion. In
the end, resource scarcity dominates the price behavior, giving rise to a U-shaped
price path (for a schematic illustration see Figure 2.1). Note that in extraction
order CBSB, resource price will always follow a U-shaped path during shale gas
production as otherwise the market would not switch away from the backstop. In
the end, as all nonrenewable resources are used up, production switches (again) to
the renewable and price stays constant at the marginal cost of the backstop.
2.4 Calibration to the U.S. gas industry
To verify that the rather simple model developed here is able to reproduce patterns
of actual resource use, we specify and calibrate the model for the U.S. natural
gas industry. The transition from conventional to shale gas in the U.S. shows a
period of simultaneous extraction. To capture this, we allow for increasing marginal
extraction costs for both types of deposits. For conventional gas we assume an







with (positive) parameters k0, kc, and β to be calibrated. We use the same type
of cost function for the extraction of shale gas, but the non-constant marginal cost
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Figure 2.1: Price and augmented marginal cost dynamics for extraction orders
CSB (top left graph), CBSB (top right graph) and CSCB (bottom left graph).
Price (in black) always follows the deposit with the smallest augmented marginal
costs (shown in different colours). The graph assumes that the discount rate is
sufficiently small (see Proposition 2.3).









where ks is a further parameter to be calibrated. This calibration assures that
the marginal extraction cost for shale gas will not be below the lower bound of
extraction cost for conventional gas. This seems a sensible assumption for shale and
conventional gas, since shale gas extraction requires the extra effort of horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing which comes at a cost even with the most advanced
technology.
25
The marginal cost of the backstop is constant and given by kb. For technology






We assume a linear inverse demand function:
P (qs + qc + qb) = d0 − d1
(
qs + qc + qb
)
, (2.18)
where d0, with d0 > kb > 0, is a choke price for natural gas use, and d1 > 0 is the
slope of the inverse demand function.
We calibrate this model to yearly production data of shale and conventional gas
in the U.S. natural gas industry from 1997 to 2017. The data is publicly avail-
able on the EIA (2017b) website. Our calibration procedure is to specify some
starting parameter set, and numerically optimize investment in shale gas extrac-
tion technology, and optimal extraction of both types of natural gas. The dynamic
optimization model is numerically implemented in AMPL with Knitro, which im-
plements state of the art interior-point and active-set algorithms for large-scale
nonlinear programming problems (Byrd et al., 1999, 2006).4 We then adjust the
parameter set to minimize the distance of extraction quantities derived from the
model and the data. The resulting calibration of the model’s parameter values is
given in Table 2.1. Note that the values for the cost parameters k0, kc, ks, kb are
given in billion USD, and the initial shale and conventional gas stocks S(1997) and
C(1997) in trillion cubic feet (Tcf).
Overall, the calibrated parameter values seem to be in a plausible range. The
calibration suggests that the overall reserves of shale gas, at the beginning of the
model period in 1997, have been considerably larger than the reserves of conven-
tional gas. To capture the rather strong effect of increased gas supply in a model
4Programming codes are available from the authors upon request.
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that does not include any exogenous influences on the gas price, we obtain a rather
large value for d1, the slope of the inverse demand function. Also the discount
rate is rather high, although not outrageous for an industry that is operating under
various risks. In the calibration, the rather high discount rate allows to reproduce
the fast dynamics of transition from conventional to shale gas.
Table 2.1: Calibrated parameter values
k0 k
c ks β kb l d0 d1 δ S(1997) C(1997) Z(1997)
0.3 3 30 0.3 8 55 15 0.4 0.1 1700 340 0.1
Figure 2.2 shows the output of the calibrated model, along with the extraction
data on which the model is calibrated. The calibrated model reproduces the ob-
served decrease in conventional gas extraction and the strong increase in shale gas
extraction after 2007. Due to the strong increase in shale gas extraction, the gas
price decreases, also in line with observations. Our calibrated model suggests that
the decrease in the gas price will continue for the next three decades, before the
price starts to monotonically increase up to the marginal cost of the backstop.
2.5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we use the calibrated model for three quantiative analyses. First, we
compare the outcomes of the model with endogenous, forward-looking technological
change to an alternative model specification where the improvement in extraction
technology comes as an unanticipated shock, as often assumed in the empirical lit-
erature. Second, we use the model with endogenous technological change to study
how the extraction of natural gas would have been influenced by the introduction
of a carbon tax. Last, we also include a carbon tax in the alternative model speci-
fication and compare the results of both model types.
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Figure 2.2: Development of conventional and shale gas extraction (top left graph),
gas price (top right), investment into shale gas extraction technology (bottom left)
and technology stock (bottom right) for the calibrated model. The crosses and dots
in the top left graph show the EIA (2017b) data on which the model is calibrated.
2.5.1 Endogenous technological change vs. technology shock
We now contrast the outcome of the calibrated model presented in the previous
section to the outcome under the alternative assumption that the improvement in
shale extraction technology (and the decrease in extraction costs) comes from an
exogenous and unanticipated shock rather than from the forward-looking behaviour
of firms that invest in research and development to maximize profits. We assume
that in 2007 technology improved from the initial to the final level of the technology
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stock in our calibrated model with endogenous technological change:
Z(t) =

Z(0) = 0.1, t ∈ [1997, 2006],
Z(T
s
) = 34, t ∈ [2007,∞].
(2.19)
Figure 2.3 shows how natural gas extraction and price dynamics change due to this
modification. Whereas at first glance both models seem to generate similar patterns
of resource extraction, there are pronounced differences, clearly visible especially in
the price development. In the model with exogenous technology shock, the price
is continuously increasing, except for the discontinuous drop in the year where the
technology shock hits. In particular, the price path follows the Hotelling rule of
exponentially increasing prices before shale gas becomes available, and again after
shale gas extraction starts. Moreover, shale gas extraction continuously decreases
after the technology shock. All these patterns are inconsistent with observations. By
contrast, the model with endogenous, forward-looking technological change shows a
continuous increase of shale gas extraction, before it peaks a few decades after shale
gas extraction started. Accordingly, the price continuously decreases for a period
of several years, and only eventually starts to increase again.
2.5.2 Effects of a carbon tax on natural gas extraction
We now turn back to our model with endogenous technological change and include
a carbon tax (τ) for producers. Assuming a carbon content of natural gas of 117
pounds of CO2 per million British thermal units (EIA, 2019a), we convert the tax
from USD/tCO2 into USD/Tcf. This allows us to include the tax in the production








Figure 2.3: Natural gas extraction and price dynamics in the model with endoge-
nous technological change (top graphs) and under the alternative assumption of an






· (qs)β + τ
)
· qs (2.21)
Figure 2.4 shows how a carbon tax affects the point in time when shale gas
production starts and the point in time when shale gas production peaks. We
define the start year as the year in which shale gas production exceeds 3 Tcf for the
first time. This implies that in our baseline model, without a carbon tax, shale gas
production starts in 2008 and peaks in 2048. If the carbon tax is small, the shale
gas boom is only delayed by a couple of years. However, as the carbon tax is scaled
up, the effect gets more pronounced. For a carbon tax of 45 USD/tCO2, the start
of the shale gas boom is pushed far into the future. Production starts in the year
2061 and peaks in 2112. Considering an even higher carbon tax of 46 USD/tCO2
30
pushes the start year and peak year outside the here considered time horizon of
2120.
Figure 2.4: The graph shows the year in which shale gas production starts (dashed
line) and the year in which shale gas production peaks (dotted line) as a function of
the carbon tax. The start year is defined as the year in which shale gas production
exceeds 3 Tcf for the first time. For a carbon tax higher than 45 USD/tCO2, the
year of the start and peak lie outside the here considered time horizon.
Figure 2.5 shows the sensitivity of the start year 2008 and 2050 with respect
to a change in the carbon tax and the discount rate. We can observe that both,
an increase in the carbon tax, but also an increase in the discount rate, induces
a shift of technology investments into the future. Due to this, the production of
shale gas is postponed. Considering for example the year 2050, the introduction of
a carbon tax of 45 USD/tCO2 is equivalent to a increase in the discount rate of
about 8 percent. The sensitivity of the timing of the shale gas extraction to the
discount rate underscores the importance of forward-looking behavior in technology
development.
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Figure 2.5: Sensitivity of the start year 2008 (dotted line) and 2050 (solid line)
to a change in the carbon tax and the discount rate.
2.5.3 Effects of a carbon tax in models with endogenous technological
change vs. technology shock
Last, we also include a carbon tax in our alternative model specification from section
2.5.1 where the improvement in extraction technology comes as an unanticipated
shock to the industry. Afterwards, we compare the results from this model to the
results from the model with endogenous technological change from section 2.5.2.
Figure 2.6 shows how a carbon tax of 45 USD/tCO2 would have affected natural
gas extraction and price development for both model types.
The results are strikingly different. As already discussed in the previous section,
in the model with endogenous technological change, the year of the start and peak
of shale gas extraction is sensitive to the level of the carbon tax. Due to the tax
of 45 USD/tCO2, the shale gas boom is pushed into the future. Extraction starts
in 2061 and peaks in 2112. This strong time-delaying effect is a specific result of
the forward-looking behaviour of firms and stands in sharp contrast to the other
model specification where the improvement in extraction technology comes as an
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unanticipated shock. Under this alternative assumption, the start year of shale gas
extraction is completely insensitive to the carbon tax. Similar to the model without
a tax, extraction starts and price drops in 2007 when the shock hits. Afterwards,
extraction continuously decreases and price continuously increases until shale and
conventional gas are depleted. This demonstrates that for policy analysis it makes
a big difference to endogenize technological change in the model.
Figure 2.6: Natural gas extraction and price development with a carbon tax
of 45 USD/tCO2 in the calibrated model with endogenous technological change
(top graphs) and under the alternative assumption of an exogenous shock to shale
extraction technology in the year 2007 (bottom graphs).
2.6 Summary and conclusions
This paper presents a novel resource-economic theory that describes the main tech-
nological developments in the U.S. natural gas industry over the last two decades
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as a result of endogenous decisions on technology investments.
We find that investments in extraction technology for shale gas start slowly and
are increasing before shale gas extraction begins. As production shifts completely
towards shale gas, our theory predicts that investments will start to decline. Similar
to the literature on technology diffusion, the technology stock develops over time in a
S-shaped fashion, first convex and then concave. Our theory also provides a simple
explanation of the recent decrease in gas prices and increase in gas production.
According to the model, resource price can follow a U-shaped path after shale gas
production starts. This finding is in contrast to Herfindahl (1967) where price
always increases after producers switch from a low to a high cost deposit type.
The calibrated model reproduces well the past development of U.S. shale gas
production. The model suggests that natural gas production will continue to grow
up to 30 Tcf and prices continue to decrease until 2050. We have also shown that for
policy analysis it makes a big difference whether technical change is the endogenous
result of forward-looking investment decisions or assumed to be an exogenous shock.
The model with endogenous technical change suggests that a carbon tax could have
postponed the shale gas boom considerably. This time-delaying effect is specific to
the model with forward-looking investment behaviour, and does not occur in models
that treat the improvement in extraction technology as an exogenous shock.
Our theory is not restricted to the natural gas industry but can also be applied
to other exhaustible resources such as oil where similar technology developments
are taking place. For all these resources, our model offers theoretical insights in
the order of extraction. We find that by endogenizing technological investments in
the Hotelling-Herfindahl model, production decisions do not only depend on initial
shadow values but also on the state of extraction technology. This allows for addi-
tional orders of resource extraction. In particular, even if firms have already shifted
to the use of the renewable backstop, production can switch back to a nonrenewable
resource for a period of time, when extraction technology has sufficiently advanced.
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A.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
The marginal benefit of the technology develops according to
d
dt
(−KsZ(qs, Z)) = −KsZZ(qs, Z)w −KsqZ(qs, Z) q̇s. (2.22)
During the phase of shale gas extraction, (2.7a) holds with equality. Differentiating that
condition with respect to time, and using (2.4) yields
(




s, Z)w + δ
(
P (qs + qc + qb)−Ksq (qs, Z)
)
. (2.23)
Using this in (2.22) and collecting terms delivers
−
(
















P (qs + qc + qb)−Ksq (qs, Z)
)
. (2.24)
The first term on the left-hand-side of this equation is positive, −
(
P ′(qs + qc + qb)−Ksqq(qs, Z)
)
> 0,
as the inverse demand function is downward-sloping and the marginal extraction costs are
non-decreasing. The first term on the right-hand-side of the equation is non-positive by the
concavity assumption, cf. (2.6). The second term on the right-hand side of the equation
is negative, as KsqZ < 0 and P −Kq = γ > 0.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
By (2.7d), the shadow price of technology is non-negative. Whenever investment is posi-
tive, such that (2.7d) holds with equality, the temporal change of investment is monotonic
in the change in the shadow price of technology, as L′′(w) ẇ = φ̇ and L′′(w) > 0 by
assumption. In a corner solution w = 0, ẇ = 0 by definition.
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Whenever qs(t) = 0, we have KsZ(q
s, Z) = 0 and thus (2.8c) implies φ̇ = δ φ. The
shadow price of technology, and, hence, investment, monotonically increases over time –
provided it is positive to begin with.
Consider the time interval t ∈ [T s, T s] with extraction from deposit type S, qs(t) > 0,
where T s is the point in time where shale gas extraction ends. It must be φ(t) = 0 for
all t ≥ T s, as otherwise φ(t) would grow at the discount rate after T s, whereas Z(t) > 0,
which would violate the transversality condition (2.8d).





s(τ), Z(τ)) dτ. (2.25)
By Lemma 2.1 we have
δ φ(t) < −KsZ(qs(t), Z(t))
∫ T s
t






< −KsZ(qs(t), Z(t)). (2.27)
Thus,
φ̇ = δ φ+KsZ(q
s(t), Z(t)) < 0. (2.28)
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
A switch in production can occur when augmented marginal costs of two resource types
are equal. Thus, we have three switch functions.
i) Switch points between shale and conventional gas are determined by the condition
that the difference of AMCs and AMCc is zero. The switch points are given as the roots
of the switch function
ψsc(t) = AMCs(t)−AMCc(t) = k(Z(t))− kc − (λ(0)− γ(0)) eδ t. (2.29)
Note that at a switch point from conventional to shale gas, investments in the technology
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stock are positive. The derivative of the switch function with respect to time is
ψ̇sc = k′(Z)w − δ (λ(0)− γ(0)) eδ t. (2.30)
The first term is negative. The second term is negative as well if λ(0)− γ(0) > 0, whereas
it is positive for λ(0) − γ(0) < 0. In case λ(0) − γ(0) ≥ 0, the switch function ψsct
is monotonically decreasing at any switch point. As the switch function is continuous,
there is at most one switch point between regimes. Furthermore, the switch must be from
conventional to shale gas. The only possibility is first deposit type C, then deposit type S.
In case λ(0)− γ(0) < 0, there may be more than one switch point. As the switch function
is continuous, it must assume a maximum or minimum in between any two switch points.
At this maximum or minimum, the curvature of the switch function is
ψ̈sc = k′′(Z)w2 + k′(Z) ẇ + δ2 (γ(0)− λ(0)) eδ t (2.31a)
= k′′(Z)w2 + k′(Z)
w
φ
(δ φ+ k′(Z) qs) + δ2 (γ(0)− λ(0)) eδ t (2.31b)





+δ (k′(Z)w + δ (γ(0)− λ(0)) eδ t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ψ̇sc
> 0. (2.31c)
Thus, ψ̈sc > 0 for any point in time where ψ̇sc = 0, which implies that ψ̇sc can change
signs only once. Overall, there are at most two switch points between the regimes. The
only possible orders of production are SC, CSC, and CS.
ii) Switch points between conventional gas and the backstop are determined by
ψcb = kc + λ(0) eδ t − kb = 0. (2.32)
We have kc−kb < 0 is constant. Thus, if there is a switch point at all, the switch function
is monotonically increasing at this point. As the switch function is continuous, there is
exactly one switch point and the switch must be from deposit type C to the backstop.
iii) Switch points between shale gas and the backstop are determined by
ψsb = k(Z) + γ(0) eδ t − kb = 0. (2.33)
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The derivative of the switch function with respect to time is
ψ̇sb = k′(Z)w + δ γ(0) eδ t. (2.34)
The first term is negative and the second term is positive, i.e. ψ̇sb may switch signs, and
thus ψsb = 0 may have more than one solution. Consider the curvature of ψsb at the
minimum or maximum, i.e. when ψ̇sb = 0:
ψ̈sb = k′′(Z)w2 + k′(Z) ẇ + δ2 γ(0) eδ t (2.35a)
= k′′(Z)w2 + k′(Z)
w
φ
(δ φ+ k′(Z) qs) + δ2 γ(0) eδ t (2.35b)





+δ (k′(Z)w + δ γ(0) eδ t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ψ̇sb
> 0. (2.35c)
Thus, ψ̈sb > 0 for any point in time where ψ̇sb = 0, which implies that ψ̇sb can change
signs only once. Overall, there are at most two switch points between regimes. The only
possible orders of production are BSB, and SB. Note that BS is not possible since w
goes to zero as the shale deposits approaches depletion. Hence, in the end ψsb must be
positive.
Looking at all combinations of the switch functions yields the four extraction orders
from Proposition 2.2. Note that ψsc(0) > ψsb(0) since kb > kc + λ(0). Hence, BSB can
never occur in combination with SC.
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Abstract: The paper analyzes solar geoengineering and strategic interactions in
an integrated assessment model (IAM) of climate change. For this purpose, we
(i) derive a new class of solutions to analytic IAMs that allows us to (ii) solve
an integrated assessment model with sulfur-based geoengineering and damages in
closed-form, and to (iii) model realistic strategic interactions between two active
regions, and a passive rest of the world. We examine the determinants of a region’s
engagement in geoengineering, and analyze the Markov game and its equilibria. Our
model suggests that sulfur deployment is highly sensitive to potential geoengineering
damages. For a global social planner, solar geoengineering could cut the Social Cost
of Carbon (SCC) into half, if damages turn out negligible. However, current damage
guesstimates would reduce the global SCC by only 12-22%. In the regional model,
the availability of geoengineering can both increase or decrease the SCC, in both the
active regions and the rest of the world, depending on the heterogeneity of climate
and geoengineering damages across regions.
Keywords: climate change, integrated assessment, solar geoengineering, dynamic
games, strategic conflicts, free-driver, free-rider, carbon tax, social cost of carbon
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3.1 Introduction
Worldwide greenhouse gas emissions are still on the rise (Tollefson, 2018) leading to
potentially severe consequences for the world and its economy. Future warming will
substantially reduce future output and may reduce global economic growth rates
(Carleton and Hsiang, 2016) apart from destroying ecosystems and driving species
to extinction (Urban, 2015; Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno, 2010). In light of these
developments, engineering a cooler climate evolves to be a hot topic. Observations
from large volcanic eruptions suggest that the deliberate injection of sulfur aerosols
into the stratosphere by airplanes can cool our planet by reflecting sunlight back
into space (Crutzen, 2006).
In this paper, we build a full-fledged Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) with
state of the art climate dynamics and an economy that transforms nonrenewable
and renewable resources into energy, final goods, and emissions. Introducing a
new class of analytic solutions, we are able to integrate the temperature response
to stratospheric sulfur injections into our model, calibrate the cooling efficiency of
sulfur well to recent scientific work of Kleinschmitt et al. (2018), and model real-
istic strategic interactions between regions. We separate climate change damages
into damages from rising temperatures and damages from increasing atmospheric
carbon concentrations (Moreno-Cruz et al., 2017; Klepper and Rickels, 2014). Geo-
engineering implies a third type of damages, side-effects of the employed chemicals
and changes in the radiative spectrum (Heckendorn et al., 2009; Crutzen, 2006;
Keith and MacMartin, 2015; Robock, 2008; Kravitz et al., 2009), which are at this
point in time mostly unknown (Emmerling and Tavoni, 2018b).
We provide an analytic description of a global planner’s optimal sulfur deploy-
ment, and show how it depends on climate and geoengineering damages, climate
dynamics, and the cooling efficiency of sulfur. Despite several non-linearities and
efficiency losses, a quantitatively well-fitted model gives rise to a sulfur deployment
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strategy that increases linearly in the atmospheric carbon concentration. The re-
sulting reduction in the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) and thus in the incentives to
abate carbon dioxide is a delicate balance between the effectiveness of sulfur-based
cooling and potential damages from geoengineering.
We split the world into two climate zones inhabited by non-cooperatively acting
regions, and a passive rest of the world that only affects the decisions of the active
regions by its contributions to the atmospheric carbon concentration. Each region
prefers a world with preindustrial temperatures but has to balance the trade-offs be-
tween climate change impacts and geoengineering damages. Geoengineering affects
regions via two channels. First, sulfur particles spread around the globe leading to
heterogeneous cooling and damage spill-overs between the active regions and the
rest of the world.5 Second, a region’s temperature adjusts to that of other regions,
directly through heat exchange across the planet and via a common ocean. Both of
these interaction channels give rise to strategic behavior. We allow each region to
either contribute to the cooling, stay inactive, or to engage in a potential counter-
measure that neutralizes part of the cooling and damage spill-overs from the other
region (Parker et al., 2018; Heyen et al., 2019).
The game solves in linear strategies. This linear dependence on the atmospheric
carbon concentration not only permits an analytic solution of the game, but also
coincides with the structure of the optimal carbon dioxide response in the non-
strategic model. In the resulting dynamic Markov game, we analyze how regional
sulfur deployment and carbon dioxide mitigation incentives depend on the charac-
teristics of both regions. We derive a set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria and
characterize three qualitatively different types of equilibria. In the climate match,
both regions contribute to global cooling. Under unilateral action, only one region
5If sulfur is injected along the equator, particles spread effectively towards the poles leading
to an almost uniform cooling effect across the globe (Lawrence et al., 2018). We deviate from
this common assumption in the regional model as recent literature suggests that the geographic
distribution of the cooling effect can be optimized by varying the latitude and altitude of injections
(Jones et al., 2018; Kravitz et al., 2017; MacMartin et al., 2017).
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engages in geoengineering and we shed some light on whether and when free-riding
or free-driving best describes such situations. Finally, we permit counter-measures
to geoengineering giving rise to another equilibrium where regional interests clash.
The introduction of counter-geoengineering also allows us to identify whether an
inactive region is free-riding or if it is opposed to the other region’s actions and
therefore engaging in counter-measures.
Our model contributes to two fields of literature. First, we add to the literature
that studies strategic incentives from solar geoengineering. Low operational costs
(Smith and Wagner, 2018; McClellan et al., 2012) and heterogeneous side-effects
(Ricke et al., 2010) have led to the concern that a country could implement geo-
engineering unilaterally at the expense of others; the so called “free-driver” incentive
(Weitzman, 2015; Pasztor et al., 2017). Heyen et al. (2019) find that the free-driver
outcome becomes unstable once counter-geoengineering is available. However, the
option of counter-geoengineering might instead lead to a “climate clash” when no
moratorium treaty (countries abstain from climate engineering) and no cooperative
deployment is realized.
A further concern is that the prospects of geoengineering could undermine tra-
ditional mitigation efforts and push society onto a “slippery slope” (Lawrence and
Crutzen, 2017; Morrow, 2014; Quaas et al., 2017). Moreno-Cruz (2015) shows that
the impact of geoengineering on mitigation depends on the similarity between coun-
tries. If countries are similar with respect to climate and geoengineering damages,
the option of geoengineering leads to lower mitigation levels. However, if countries
differ with respect to damages, mitigation in both countries can increase.
Our paper contributes to this literature by taking the strategic incentives govern-
ing geoengineering into a dynamic integrated assessment model of climate change.
We characterize Markov perfect equilibria where regions’ interests either match,
clash, or exhibit free-riding, or free-driving behavior. Moreover, we derive analytic
formulas for the regional SCC to study how the availability of geoengineering affects
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mitigation incentives in the active regions, and whether the passive rest of the world
makes the slope of geoengineering even more slippery, or turns the slippery slope
uphill.
Second, we contribute to the recently emerging literature on analytic integrated
assessment models of climate change that derive closed-form solutions for the glob-
ally optimal carbon tax (Traeger, 2018; Golosov et al., 2014; Gerlagh and Lsiki,
2018). We explain the components that reduce earlier formulas for the optimal
carbon tax because of our ability to cool the planet.
Our study is among the first to analyze the strategic interaction of regions within
an integrated assessment model. Other game-theoretic models include Nordhaus
and Yang (1996), who develop a regional version of the DICE model (Nordhaus and
Sztorc, 2013) which is called the RICE model. Tol (2002a,b) uses the multi-regional
FUND model to estimate the damages of climate change. Nordhaus (2015) studies
free-riding incentives in climate agreements and introduces the idea of climate clubs
with trade penalties for non-participants. Hassler and Krusell (2012) develop a
dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with multiple regions that can be
solved in closed-form, and show that only taxes on oil producers can mitigate climate
change. Taxes on oil consumers have no effect. Hambel et al. (2018) analyze the
role of international trade in a regional analytic climate economy model and find
that the SCC increases in trade volume.
Our paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces sulfur-based
geoengineering into the analytic climate economy model from Traeger (2018), and
derives the optimal sulfur strategy and the optimal carbon tax for a global planner.
In section 3.3, we split the model into two non-cooperatively acting regions, and a
passive rest of the world. We first discuss the results of a baseline model version
without heat flows, and analyze how the rest of the world reacts to the decisions of
the active regions. Afterwards, we allow heat to equilibrate across the globe, and
show how this affects regional strategies, and mitigation incentives.
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3.2 Global model
This section introduces geoengineering into the analytic climate economy model
ACE (Traeger, 2018). First, we summarize a slightly simplified version of the ACE
model. Then, we introduce geoengineering and calibrate the forcing effect of sulfur
to scientific data. Finally, we discuss the optimal cooling strategy of the social
planner and the difference that geoengineering makes for the optimal carbon tax.
3.2.1 Economy
Production. Gross output is a function of vectors of dimension Ij with j ∈
{A,N,K,E}. The technology levels At are exogenous. Capital is optimally dis-
tributed over the different sectors, resulting in the capital levels summarized by the
vector Kt. Labor distribution is denoted by N t and energy inputs by Et.
Yt = F(At, Kt, N t, Et) (3.1)
The production function is homogeneous of degree κ in capital such that
F(At, λKt, N t, Et) = λκF(At, Kt, N t, Et) ∀ λ ∈ R+. (3.2)




Damages. We denote the atmospheric carbon stock (or concentration) byM1,t.




Global atmospheric temperature T1,t measures the temperature increase over 1900
levels (in degree Celsius). Atmospheric temperature increase, atmospheric carbon
concentration, as well as the level of the cooling agent St cause (net) damages
Dt(T1,t, St,mt) that we measure as a fraction of output. They are of the form
Dt(T1,t, St,mt) = 1− exp [−DT (T1,t)−DG(St)−Dm(mt)] . (3.3)
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We take the temperature-based damages
DT (T1,t) = ξ0 exp (ξ1 T1,t)− ξ0 (3.4)
from the ACE model’s calibration to DICE. Our global model assumes
DG(St) = d St (3.5)
making d the semi-elasticity of damages from stratospheric sulfur injections (the
percentage loss of output resulting from an additional ton of sulfur injections). The
parameter d includes linear operational costs. Our regional version of the model in
section 3.3 further refines the damage parameter into damages from geoengineer-
ing, counter-geoengineering, and the costs of injecting the chemical agents into the
stratosphere. The net costs of atmospheric carbon are
Dm(mt) = a (mt − 1), (3.6)
where a is the semi-elasticity of production with respect to changes in the carbon
dioxide concentration. Costs include ocean-acidification and benefits the fertilizer
effect that increases plant production and crop yields (Proctor et al., 2018).
Emissions, resources and capital. The first Id energy inputs E1, ..., EId
are fossil fuels causing CO2 emission and are collected in subvector Edt . These
energy inputs are measured in terms of their CO2 content so that total emissions
from production are
∑Id
i=1Ei,t. Fossil fuel resource stocks are collected in vector
Rt ∈ RI
d
+ . The dynamics of the resource stock are
Rt+1 = Rt −Edt (3.7)
with initial stock size R0 ∈ RI
d
+ . Renewable energies are indexed by Id+1 to IE.
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We assume full depreciation of capital over the course of a decade, the model’s
time step. We choose this simplifying assumption noting that Traeger’s (2018)
extension for capital persistence would also go through in our setting. The global
economy’s capital stock evolves as
Kt+1 = Yt [1−Dt (T1,t, St,mt)]− Ct (3.8)
= Yt exp [−ξ0 exp (ξ1 T1,t) + ξ0 − d St − a(mt − 1)]− Ct.
3.2.2 Climate
Carbon dioxide. Similar to DICE, we consider three carbon reservoirs, atmo-
sphere (carbon content M1), upper ocean (carbon content M2) and lower ocean
(carbon content M3) which we summarize in the vectorM . The extension to addi-
tional carbon reservoirs is straight-forward. The dynamics of the carbon reservoirs
is
M t+1 = ΦM t + ẽt, (3.9)





t resulting from industrial fossil fuel burning and other
exogenous processes including lang use change and forestry.
Greenhouse effect and cooling. Greenhouse gases in the atmosphere as well
as geoengineering affect our planet’s temperature. The net heating with respect to
preindustrial times is summarized by the resulting radiative forcing Ft (measured in
W/m2). It increases (logarithmically) in the increase of atmospheric CO2 relative
to preindustrial levels mt and it falls as a consequence of geoengineering measures

















We ignore non-CO2 greenhouse gases, which can easily be added as in the ACE
model. The next subsection will fit a data-based approximation Ft to F exactt that
will replace the generic formulation above. It is common to express radiative forcing
in CO2 equivalents, which corresponds to the argument of the logarithm on the right
side of the equation. We note that, in terms of CO2 equivalents, the forcing from
sulfur and CO2 are no longer independent (see section 3.2.3).
Temperature dynamics. In the medium to long run a new level of radiative
forcing implies the new atmospheric equilibrium temperature T0,t = sη Ft. Follow-
ing ACE, we model the evoloution of atmospheric temperature T1,t as a general-
ized mean of last period’s atmospheric temperature (persistence), the last period’s
ocean temperature (currently cooling), and the new equilibrium temperature cor-
responding to radiative forcing T0,t. Similarly ocean temperature T2,t evolves as a













(1− σ12) exp (ξ1 T2,t) + σ12 exp (ξ1 T1,t)
)
(3.10a)
with ξ1 = log 2s . We rewrite these equations in terms of transformed temperatures






















Based on the experience of many volcanic eruptions scientists have learned that the
injection of small sulfur particles (aerosols) into the atmosphere reflects sunlight
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back into space cooling our planet. Yet, at high injection rates, sulfur particles
lump together which decreases their cooling efficiency. As a result, scientists ex-
pect that the cooling from stratospheric aerosol injections has an asymptotic limit
(Lawrence et al., 2018). The uncertainty governing the forcing efficiency is high
and the instantaneous radiative forcing effect of sulfur injections varies strongly
across different climate models (Kleinschmitt et al., 2018; Lawrence et al., 2018;
Niemeier and Schmidt, 2017; Niemeier and Timmreck, 2015). Table 3.1 shows
model data on the effective radiative forcing effect from sulfur injections from two
recent studies. Note that the effective radiative forcing effect, which also includes
rapid adjustments such as changes in atmospheric temperature, is larger than the
instantaneous radiative forcing effect (Boucher et al., 2017).6
Table 3.1: Effective radiative forcing effect from sulfur injections
Kleinschmitt et al. (2018)
TgS 2 5 10 20 50
W/m2 -1.11 -1.64 -2.91 -4.34 -5.63
Niemeier and Schmidt (2017)
TgS 4 6 8 10 30 40 50
W/m2 -0.34 -1.30 -1.54 -1.78 -4.04 -4.76 -5.18
Units. A negative 6 W/m2 (Watts per square meter) is approximately double
the cooling power that we have currently produced in terms of warming a result
of antropogenic greenhouse gas emissions since preindustrial times (IPCC, 2013).
1 TgS/yr (Tera grams sulfur per year) are 1 Million tons of sulfur annually deployed
into the stratosphere. Each TgS/yr corresponds to approximately 25 Boeing 747
loads deployed daily for a year. We note that a Boeing cannot make it into the
stratosphere, but it can fuel fighter jets that deploy the sulfur in the necessary
altitude. Other options to deploy the sulfur include stratospheric balloons (Robock
et al., 2009).
6 In addition, the literature has proposed alternative aerosols like alumina and diamond parti-
cles (Weisenstein et al., 2015; Dykema et al., 2016), calcite or limestone (Keith et al., 2016). Given
the lack of a natural experiment with such aerosols, our knowledge about the resulting forcing
effect is even more limited.
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Calibration. We calibrate our model to the recent study by Kleinschmitt et al.
(2018).7 For this purpose, we develop a new functional form with several degrees of
freedom that will permit an analytic solution of the dynamic programming problem.
We approximate exact radiative forcing for the use of stratospheric sulfur injections
by
















The expression FCO2t characterizes the effect of sulfur on radiative forcing in CO2
equivalents. In the absence of geoengineering, the term mt would capture the CO2
forcing. The round inner bracket reduces the forcing in response to sulfur injections.





. Sulfur forcing is more
efficient relative to CO2 the larger the atmospheric carbon concentration and the
lower the sulfur concentration. For high levels of sulfur, particles lump together
reducing their cooling efficiency. The higher the CO2 concentration, the lower the
warming implied by the marginal ton of CO2 and the higher the relative forcing
reduction of sulfur, which we measure in CO2 equivalents. We summarize both of
these nonlinearities in the joint term whose level effect is captured by f3 and whose
nonlinearity is captured by n > 0.
We fit the function to Kleinschmitt et al.’s (2018) data on effective radiative forc-
ing from sulfur injections (Table 3.1).8 Our fit combines Kleinschmitt et al.’s (2018)
forcing data for sulfur injections with the well-known forcing from atmospheric car-
bon dioxide over the interval mt ∈ [1.5, 3], i.e. up to a tripling of preindustrial
carbon dioxide emissions. Our fit minimizes the squared differences for those 80
data points. We list the resulting parameters in Table 3.2.
7Note that the publication only cites the instantaneous radiative forcing impact of sulfur. We
obtained the effective radiative forcing effect in Table 3.1 from the authors in personal correspon-
dence.
8The function Ft can also be calibrated well to data from other studies (see Appendix B.1.1).
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Table 3.2: Estimated forcing parameters
f0 f1 f2 f3 n
0.254 1.16 0.014 0.46 0.69
In Appendix B.1.1, we show radiative forcing resulting from a given annual flow
of sulfur injections at a given atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration in a 3D
graph. Figure 3.1 illustrates the goodness of our fit, slicing the 3D graph in the two
dimensions and adding the data points from Kleinschmitt et al. (2018). We assume
that total radiative forcing remains positive (above preindustrial levels). Based on
our empirical fit of the radiative forcing equation we take the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. The (fit-)parameters fi, i ∈ {0, ..., 3}, are positive and 0 <
n < 1. Radiative forcing remains above the preindustrial level, Ft > 0, and sulfur
injections are between 2 and 50 TgS.
Figure 3.1: Approximation of radiative forcing Ft to model data (shown by cir-
cles) from Kleinschmitt et al. (2018) for sulfur injections between 2 and 50 TgS, and
positive radiative forcing levels (see Assumption 3.1). The left graph shows radia-
tive forcing as a function of sulfur for different atmospheric carbon concentrations.
The right graph shows radiative forcing as a function of the atmospheric carbon
concentration for different sulfur injection rates.
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Operational costs and damages of geoengineering. Table 3.3 shows re-
cent cost estimates on stratospheric sulfur injections by newly designed airplanes.
Estimates are given for a reduction in radiative forcing (W/m2) or the quantity of
sulfur injected into the stratosphere (Mt). Stars denote the original values from the
study. The values in Table 3.3 suggest average operational costs of d = 0.0017%.9
Table 3.3: Annual operational costs of stratospheric sulfur injections
Authors Estimate
Klepper and Rickels (2012) billion USD 2-18 for -1∗ W/m2 ≈ 2 TgS
Moriyama et al. (2017) billion USD 10 for -2∗ W/m2 ≈ 7 TgS
McClellan et al. (2012) billion USD 1-3 for 1∗ TgS
billion USD 2-8 for 5∗ TgS
Smith and Wagner (2018) billion USD 1.5 for 1∗ TgS
Assessments of the economic impacts from geoengineering (e.g. from acid rain)
suffer from insufficient observation. Some authors, for example Moreno-Cruz and
Keith (2013), therefore analyze optimal policy as a function of the damage param-
eter while others make explicit assumptions, acknowledging that there is limited
or non-existent empirical bases. We show several of those estimates in Table 3.4.
Heutel et al. (2018) assume a cost of 3% of world output for resetting radiative
forcing to its preindustrial level, independent of the prevailing forcing level. In
general, it is more expensive cooling the planet down to preindustrial forcing levels
when CO2 concentrations are higher. We interpret their costs as the average of
neutralizing the forcing of carbon concentrations of m ∈ {1.5, 2, 2.5, 3} and find an
approximate cost guesstimate of dH ≈ 0.21%.10 Emmerling and Tavoni’s (2018b)
9At an annual world output of 135 trillion USD (purchasing power parity, IMF 2018), a de-
ployment cost of 1 billion USD translates into a fractional output cost of d = 7.4 × 10−4 %. In
compiling the average, we give equal weight to authors (putting only half the weight on each of
McClellan et al.’s (2012) estimates).
10To translate the value from Heutel et al. (2018) into our model, we denote by Sprem the
sulfur levels required to neutralize the antropogenic forcing of carbon concentrations of m ∈
{1.5, 2, 2.5, 3}. This range of carbon concentrations corresponds approximately to the concentra-










guesstimate is for a forcing reduction of 3.5 W/m2, independent of the prevailing
forcing level. Our model captures a decreasing efficiency of sulfur deployment, and
a 3.5 W/m2 reduction at low levels of cooling implies lower sulfur injections than the
same forcing reduction at an already high level of cooling. Using an intermediate
value, we convert Emmerling and Tavoni’s (2018b) guesstimate into a damage of
0.1%.11 The doubling of CO2 forcing in Goes et al. (2011) is similar to the forcing
increase of 3.5 W/m2 and the range of damages of 0-5% translate into a range for
the damage parameter of 0-0.17%.
Table 3.4: Damages from solar geoengineering
Authors Best guess
Emmerling and Tavoni (2018b) Consumption loss of 3% compensating
each 3.5 W/m2 of forcing
Heutel et al. (2018) GDP loss of 3% for setting forcing
back to the preindustrial level
Goes et al. (2011) GDP loss between 0 and 5% per forcing
equivalent to a doubling CO2 forcing
3.2.4 Global planner solution







subject to model equations (3.1)-(3.11) and Assumption 3.1. The parameter β
denotes the utility discount factor (pure time preference). In the regional model,
each region follows the analogous objective for their own region’s welfare (no trade).
In Appendix B.1.2 we solve the inter-temporal optimization problem and derive the
global optimal level of sulfur deployment.
11Figure 3.1 shows that at low initial cooling level, 25 TgS reduce cooling e.g. along the red
curve by approximately 3.5 W/m2. In contrast, reducing forcing by 3.5 W/m2 along the green
curve (triple preindustrial concentration) requires over 40 TgS. Using a value of 30 TgS, we obtain
the damage guesstimate of dE = 0.1%.
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Proposition 3.1. The optimal level of sulfur deployment is
S∗t =
(





with climate change impact γ = β ξ0 σ̃11 σforc and temperature dynamics contribution
σ̃11 = [(1− β σ)−1]11, where [·]11 denotes the first element of the inverted matrix in
square brackets.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2.2.
The optimal level of sulfur deployment increases linearly in the atmospheric
carbon concentration. We refer to the proportionality factor
z ≡
(





as the geoengineering propensity. It will reappear in the strategic setting and char-
acterizes the drivers and moderators of the cooling effort given the atmospheric
carbon concentration. This cooling propensity increases in the discount factor β,
the temperature damage coefficient ξ0, and the sulfur efficiency f3. Sulfur deploy-
ment decreases in geoengineering damages d and the non-linear efficiency loss of
sulfur cooling n.12
Using the fit parameters from Table 3.2 and the parameter values from the








as a function of the damage (semi-)elasticity of sulfur, and the atmospheric carbon
















n(1−n) < 0 since Assumption 3.1 requires St ≥ 2 for
mt ∈ [1.5, 3], and thus zn = (1−n) γ f3d+γ f2 ≥ 1.22.
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The calibrated formula shows that the optimal sulfur deployment is extremely
sensitive to damages from geoengineering. The left graph in Figure 3.2 shows the
optimal level of sulfur as a function of the damage parameter d for different carbon
stocks. Inserting S∗t into equation (3.11) yields the optimal level of radiative forcing
as a function of the damage parameter d and the atmospheric carbon stock, which
we show in the right graph of Figure 3.2. The higher the damages, the higher the
tolerated forcing and, thus, warming levels.
Figure 3.2: The graph shows the optimal level of sulfur (left) and the optimal
level of radiative forcing (right) as a function of the damage parameter d (in %) for
different atmospheric carbon stocks mt.
We restrict our model to “well-calibrated” intervals. These intervals depend on
the carbon stock mt ∈ [1.5, 3] and result from Assumption 3.1 restricting sulfur
levels between 2 and 50 TgS and requiring a positive radiative forcing level. For
lower than the depicted damage levels either St > 50 TgS or Ft < 0. For higher
damages it must be that St < 2.
We now study the SCC and, thus, optimal carbon tax in the presence of solar
geoengineering. The SCC reflects the long-term damage from releasing a marginal
ton of CO2 into the atmosphere. Proposition 3.1 shows that an increase of atmo-
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spheric carbon increases the level of geoengineering. As a result, geoengineering
partially mitigates the damages from the release of a ton of CO2.
















with the carbon dynamics contribution φ̃11 = [(1− βΦ)−1]11, where [·]11 denotes the
first element of the inverted matrix in square brackets. As defined in connection to





n and the climate
change impact is γ = β ξ0 σ̃11 σforc.





sets the scale and units of the SCC. The square brackets char-
acterize net damages and the term φ̃11 amplifies the SCC as a result of the long
life-time of atmospheric CO2 (carbon cycle).13 Earlier analytic integrated assess-
ment models like ACE only contain a term corresponding to our f1γ reflecting the
cost resulting from a temperature increase in the absence of climate engineering.
First, formula (3.16) adds the term a reflecting the direct net damages from atmo-
spheric CO2 caused by ocean-acidification net of the land-based fertilization effect.
Second, it introduces the term in round brackets, which reduces the SCC as a re-
sult of geoengineering (the bracket is always positive). This reduction of the SCC
increases in the level of geoengineering, but at a falling rate; the geoengineering
propensity z in the denominator of f3
zn
reflects that the effectiveness of sulfur-based
cooling decreases in the level of geoengineering. This reduction of the SCC increases
in the effectiveness of geoengineering f3. Third, the damages from geoengineering
d add to the SCC, and more so the higher the sulfur deployment per unit of carbon
(geoengineering propensity z).






a simple decay, it captures how much carbon inserted into the atmosphere remains in or returns
to the atmosphere over the discounted infinite time horizon. A similar interpretation applies to
the heat flow contribution σ̃11.
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The SCC’s composition in Proposition (3.2) explains how the SCC responds to
the geoengineering propensity. Yet, the geoengineering propensity is itself a func-
tion of damages and the sulfur’s cooling effectiveness. Breaking the geoengineering
















The qualitative dependence of this SCC-reduction on damages d and cooling ef-
fectiveness f3 remains as discussed above. We observe that the SCC-reduction is
less responsive to geoengineering damages than is the geoengineering propensity z




as 0 < n < 1). Lower
damages increase the geoengineering propensity and, thus, the cooling response to
atmospheric carbon. As a result, the marginal direct impact of releasing carbon de-
creases, but the indirect impact by triggering a larger deployment of sulfur partially
offsets this benefit from the reduced temperature impact.
Quantifying the SCC, we follow ACE using a time step of 10 years and the
parameter specification summarized in Table 3.5.14 Together with our radiative
forcing estimates from Table 3.2 we obtain the optimal carbon tax in (USD-2018-)
money-measured consumption equivalents as a function of the damage parameters.
Table 3.5: Parameter values from ACE re-calibrated for 2 temperature layers
Y nett Mpre β ξ0 σforc σ̃11 φ̃
135× 1013 3.667× 600× 109 0.98610 0.021 0.52 1.22 4.26
Figure 3.3 graphs this SCC as a function of the geoengineering damages d for a
given damage parameter a = 0 (no direct damages from an increase in the atmo-
spheric carbon stock) and a = 0.1%.
14We re-calibrated ACE’s temperature dynamics to use two rather than three temperature
layers. This common simplification hardly affects the model’s ability to replicate the temperature
dynamics of scientific climate models and substantially eases the presentation of the regional model
in Section 3.3. The calibration follows the same method as in Traeger (2018).
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Figure 3.3: The graph shows the global SCC (in USD/tCO2) as a function of the
geoengineering damage parameter d (in %) without ocean acidification damages,
a = 0, and with damages of a = 0.1%, and compares it to the SCC in ACE.
3.3 Non-cooperative regions
We now split the world into regions that act non-cooperatively. We focus on two
active regions A and B that consider engaging in climate engineering, either sulfur-
based cooling or counter-geoengineering. The rest of the world only affects the
decisions of regions A and B through their contributions to the global carbon stock.
3.3.1 Regional economies and climate dynamics
This section explains the changes required to split up the world in several economic
and climate regions. It also introduces more detailed damage specifications and the
option to engage in counter-geoengineering.
Regional economies and emissions. The regional economies follow equa-
tions (3.1)-(3.8), where functional forms and parameters are idiosyncratic to the
regions. CO2 mixes globally and the CO2 dynamics are still described by equa-
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tion (3.9). However, the total CO2 emissions are now resulting from region A,













Regional temperature dynamics. We characterize two climate zones by
temperature levels TA1,t and TB1,t, containing the two active regions. For simplicity,
we assume that the rest of the world is part of region B’s temperature zone. Anal-
ogously to the global case, we define transformed temperatures τA1,t = exp(ξ1 TA1,t),
τB1,t = exp(ξ1 T
B
1,t), and τ2,t = exp(ξ1 T2,t) with ξ1 =
log 2
s
. Then the regional temper-









































where σAA = 1−σAB−σAO−σforc, σBB = 1−σBA −σBO−σforc, and σOO = 1−σOA−σOB . To
preserve symmetry in notation, we define the corresponding matrix σB by swapping
the first and second rows and columns, characterizing the identical dynamics from
the perspective of region B. In anticipation of a similar climate impact as in the











for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
The term σ̃A11 characterizes the discounted heat increase in region A over the infinite
time horizon resulting from a heat influx into region A’s atmosphere in the present,
and σ̃A12 characterizes the discounted heat increase in region A over the infinite
time horizon resulting from an influx into region B’s atmosphere in the present.15






We spell out the dynamics in terms of actual temperatures TA1,t, TB1,t, and T2,t in
Appendix B.1.3.1.
Regional forcing. Radiative forcing in region A is a function of global atmo-
spheric carbon and the geoengineering undertaken in the two regions. We let αB SBt
and αA SAt denote the spill-over of the cooling or the counter-geoengineering agent
from one region to the other.16 The parameter αA < 1 (αB < 1) determines the
share of region A’s (B’s) injection of the cooling or counter-geoengineering agent
that travels to region B (A). The magnitude of the α parameter depends in partic-
ular on the geographic location of the two regions. For example, the α parameters
will be relatively low if one region is located on the northern and the other region on
the southern hemisphere (e.g. the US and Brazil). It will be close to unity if both
regions are located on the same hemisphere and at similar latitude (e.g. Europe
and North America). It will be asymmetric if one region lies North of the other on
the same hemisphere (e.g. Canada would get perfect spill-over from the US, but the







































We assume that a counter-measure (St < 0) exists and can be used to neutralize




, characterizes how much of the heat flow entering temperature layer j in the present still
remains in or returns to layer i after l periods.
16The cooling potential of sulfur does not only depend on the injection rate but also on the
location of the injections. If sulfur particles are injected in the tropics, they spread effectively
towards the poles (Lawrence et al., 2018). As a consequence, it is impossible to do regional
climate management using stratospheric geoengineering without spillovers to the other regions.
Recent studies suggest that it might be possible to optimize the geographic distribution of the
cooling by varying the altitude, latitude and season of injections (Visioni et al., 2019; Dai et al.,
2018; Jones et al., 2018; MacMartin et al., 2017; Kravitz et al., 2017).
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(part of) the cooling imposed by the other region (counter-geoengineering). Based
on our radiative forcing approximation and Assumption 3.1 from the global model
we assume 2 TgS ≤ SAt + αB SBt ≤ 50 TgS, and 2 TgS ≤ SBt + αA SAt ≤ 50 TgS.
Regional damages and counter-geoengineering. Geoengineering creates
damages and operational costs which, for region A, we summarize in dAA for the
marginal costs of the region’s own action, and dBA for the marginal damages im-










− (dAASAt + dBA αB SBt )− aA (mt − 1)
]
.
Region A’s self-imposed marginal costs dAA depend on whether it is cooling or










dcAA − εcA for SAt < 0
0 for SAt = 0
where dgAA is the damage from sulfur-based cooling and ε
g
A > 0 is the cost of injecting
the sulfur into the stratosphere. The parameter dcAA characterizes the damage
reduction (noting that SAt < 0) from employing counter-geoengineering, and εcA ≥ 0
is the cost of counter-geoengineering. For the damages imposed by region B onto






dgBA for αB S
B
t > 0
dcBA for αB SBt < 0
0 for αB SBt = 0
where dcBA is again a partial offsetting of the damages from region A’s climate engi-
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neering in case region B is countering it. While the direct radiative forcing damage
will be offset, the damages caused by the chemical agent sulfur will probably not be
offset, only partially offset, or maybe even enhanced by the counter-geoengineering
agent. Thus dcAA will generally be strictly lower than d
g
AA in the real world (and it
could potentially even be negative). Therefore, we restrict the damage parameters
in the active regions as follows.
Assumption 3.2. The damage relief from counter-geoengineering is smaller than
the damage caused by geoengineering: dcij ≤ d
g
il for i, j, l ∈ {A,B}.
By symmetry we obtain the same damage definitions for region B (see Appendix
B.1.3.1). We note that Assumption 3.2 combines necessary assumptions to guaran-






BB), and assumptions that
we only impose because they seem economically sensible.
3.3.2 Results of the base model
For ease of presentation, the present section turns off the direct heat transfer be-
tween the regions.
Assumption 3.3. The heat flow coefficients σAB, σBA , σOA , and σOB are zero.
As a result, the regional climates interact only through the spill-over of the
cooling and, potentially, counter-geoengineering agents. The assumption simplifies
the functional expressions without changing the qualitative results as we show in
section 3.3.4 where we relax Assumption 3.3.
The section identifies a set of equilibrium strategies, characterizes the resulting
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria and derives corresponding formulas for the result-
ing non-cooperative SCC levels in the different regions. Appendix B.1.3 solves the
corresponding dynamic Markov game. In every period, the regions control their
sulfur (and CO2) emissions optimally, anticipating the future reaction of the other
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region to its own actions; the solution is sometimes referred to as a feedback equi-
librium (as opposed to an open-loop equilibrium).
Proposition 3.3 (Strategies). The following strategies characterize a Markov per-
fect Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game. If (i) SBt = 0 region A chooses
SAt (mt) = z
g
Amt and if (ii) S
B





zgA − αB zB
)









for SAt < 0
SAt = 0 otherwise
with geoengineering propensity and counter-geoengineering reluctance
zgA =
(
(1− n) f3 γA









(1− n) f3 γA
f2 γA + (dcAA − εcA)
) 1
n





ping region indices characterizes region B’s strategies. Note that in equation (3.18)
zB ∈ {zgB, zcB} depending on whether SBt ≷ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.6.
The game solves in linear strategies. This linear dependence on the carbon
stock not only permits an analytic solution of the game, but also coincides with
the structure of the (unique) optimal CO2 response in a non-strategic model (see
Proposition 3.1).
One active region. In the case where one of the regions remains inactive
(SBt = 0), the other region’s optimal cooling effort is structurally the same as in the
social planner setting (Proposition 3.2); sulfur deployment increases proportional
to the atmospheric carbon concentration and to the geoengineering propensity zgA.
As in the social planner setting, this cooling propensity increases in the climate
change impact components summarized in γA and the sulfur efficiency f3. Sulfur
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deployment decreases in geoengineering damages and the non-linear efficiency loss n
of sulfur cooling. In difference to the social planner, the active region only accounts
for its own climate impact γA and for its own damages dgAA and costs ε
g
A from
geoengineering (damages and costs were combined into a single term d in the social
planner’s problem).
Both regions cooling. In the case where both regions engage in cooling,
the strategic interaction adds two new aspects to sulfur deployment. First, a re-
gion acknowledges the other region’s contribution and reduces its own sulfur de-
ployment accordingly. In equation (3.18), this direct response subtracts the spill-
over-weighted geoengineering propensity αBzgB of the other region from its original
geoengineering propensity zgA. Second, the region anticipates that also the other
region will respond to its own action. Because of the linear response functions,
this higher order reaction leads to the multiplier 1
1−αAαB
; it scales up region A’s
action as a result of its anticipation that region B reduces its sulfur deployment
(“free-rides”) in response to A’s action. This higher order response counteracts the
initial free-riding incentive. The higher order response increasing the sulfur deploy-
ment is always lower in magnitude than the initial decrease.17 In summary, with
both regions cooling, each region’s sulfur deployment (i) decreases strategically as a
result the joint action (or "free-riding"), but this decrease is (ii) partially offset by
a region’s anticipation of the other region’s cooling reduction (or "free-riding").
Counter-geoengineering. In the case where the regions’ interests clash, one
region, say region B, is cooling. Region B’s “excessive” geoengineering propensity
zgB spilling over into region A drives region A to engage in counter-geoengineering
17The finding is less obvious at second thought. The initial free-riding incentive grows in the
other region’s geoengineering propensity, whereas a region’s anticipation of the other regions free-
riding is (analogously) driven by its own geoengineering propensity. In principle, a region’s an-




















A. However, if region





B) the two regions would be in an equilibrium where only region A is cooling
and region B free-rides (or counter-geoengineers) from the start as we will establish in Proposition
3.4.
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(SAt < 0). A higher zcA still states that region A would prefer relatively more
cooling, but less than what region B is going for. Thus, we call zcA the counter-
geoengineering reluctance (rather than the geoengineering propensity). A higher
zcA pushes out the point where region A starts to engage in counter-geoengineering
and, once it does counter-geoengineering, a higher zcA reduces its level. The sign
in front of the deployment costs εA switches because reducing SAt now imposes
deployment costs of the counter-geoengineering agent (rather than reducing sulfur
deployment costs). This discrete jump from reducing sulfur deployment costs to
creating counter-geoengineering costs ensures a non-trivial (zgB-)interval where A
simply remains inactive.
In this climate-clash setting, the direct strategic response to the other region’s
cooling drives counter-geoengineering. The higher order response leads once again
to the multiplier 1
1−αAαB
. Here, it scales up region A’s action as a result of its
anticipation that region B increases its sulfur deployment in response to A’s counter-
geoengineering. In the “riding” metaphor, A presses down the gas pedal extra-hard
because it anticipates that B presses down the gas pedal further when it realizes that
A tries to pull the planet into the opposite direction. Yet, the outcome in our setting
is more favorable than the metaphor suggests. Because spill-overs are incomplete
(αAαB < 1), the simultaneous warming and cooling in the two regions brings both
regions closer to their desired temperatures.
Figure 3.4 shows the deployment of sulfur or the counter-geoengineering agent
for region A and B as a function of region B’s geoengineering propensity zgB by
varying dgBB (and assuming d
c
BB = 0.5 d
g
BB). To get a unique parameterization in
terms of propensities, the graph shows zgB even if the chosen strategy is z
c
B. We
assume a fixed geoengineering propensity and counter-geoengineering aversion for
region A, and define ∆ zA = αA zgA − (zcB − z
g
B). In case each region’s propensity to





B , both regions deploy sulfur. If region B’s geoengineering propensity is smaller
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Figure 3.4: The graph shows the regional strategies as a function of region B’s
geoengineering propensity zgB by varying d
g
BB. Each region either deploys sulfur
(shown in green), the neutralizing agent (shown in red), or stays inactive (shown
in blue). The dotted black line depicts the target level of sulfur in region A (SAt +
αB S
B
t ). We defined ∆ zA = αA z
g
A − (zcB − z
g
B).
than the spillovers from region A, zgB < αA z
g
A, there are two possibilities: If region
B’s reluctance to engage in counter-geoengineering is low enough, and zgB < ∆ zA, it
will react by deploying the neutralizing agent. Otherwise, region B remains inactive.
Similarly, the same happens if region A’s geoengineering propensity is smaller than




B : Region B cools while region A












region A keeps the (target) level of sulfur in its region (given by SAt + αB SBt ) at
the constant level zgAmt. Since counter-geoengineering is not able to perfectly offset




B region A increases its (target) level of
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sulfur towards zcAmt.
We now identify the parameter ranges that give rise to the different equilibria
and show that they are mutually exclusive and cover the full parameter domain.
Proposition 3.4 (Equilibria). The strategies in Proposition 3.3 give rise to 5 qual-
itatively different Nash equilibria. They are mutually exclusive and classified based
on fundamentals as follows:
Climate clash SAt > 0, S
B
t < 0 : α
−1
A < h
Free-driver/rider SAt > 0, S
B
t = 0 : h ≤ α−1A ≤ H
Climate match SAt > 0, S
B
t > 0 : αB < H < α
−1
A
Free-driver/rider SAt = 0, S
B
t > 0 : H ≤ αB ≤ Ĥ
Climate clash SAt < 0, S
B












We note that h ≤ H ≤ Ĥ and that αB ≤ α−1A .
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.7.
Two fully symmetric regions would desire the same geoengineering target, imply-
ing H = 1. They would be in the climate match equilibrium where both contribute
equally to the overall cooling (assuming imperfect spill-overs αA, αB < 1). As re-
gion A’s perceived damages from geoengineering increase, it’s cooling costs become
larger (relative to GDP), or its climate impacts would be lower, H falls along with
its geoengineering propensity zgA. Initially, this fall merely implies that region A
contributes less to the cooling, but eventually region A will become inactive (“free-
ride”). This switch occurs when the spill-overs from region B dominate region A’s
own geoengineering propensity, zgA ≤ αBz
g
B. Alternatively, one could call this sce-
nario the free-driving of region B, which unilaterally sets the global temperature
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distribution. However, if region A’s perceived damages from geoengineering are
even higher and/or climate damages even lower as compared to those of region
B, region A will no longer tolerate the geoengineering level imposed by region B.
Then, it is worthwhile for region A to pay the costs of counter-geoengineering. This
shift in equilibria happens when the spillovers from region B not only surpass its
geoengineering propensity, but also its (higher) counter-geoengineering reluctance,
zcA < αBz
g
B (⇔ Ĥ < αB).
The left graph in Figure 3.5 illustrates how the domain of the Nash equilib-
ria shifts under an increase in the cost of geoengineering (damages or operational
costs). Dashed lines show the domain before the change occurs, solid lines and color
coding mark the domain of equilibria after the change. An increase in the cost of
geoengineering for region A decreases its geoengineering propensity zgA. As a result,
the domain where region A free-rides on region B expands (blue area shifting down
together with H). At the same time, the domain where region B cools together with
region A rather than B free-riding expands to the right, and so does the domain
where region B free-rides rather than engaging in counter-geoengineering. These
shifts to the right state that region B is not free-riding or engaging in counter-
geoengineering even for higher spill-overs αA from region A.
The right graph in Figure 3.5 illustrates how the domain of the Nash equilib-
ria shift under an increase in the cost of counter-geoengineering (increase in op-
erational costs or decrease in effectiveness). It increases region A’s reluctance to
engage in counter-geoengineering zcA, and expands the domain where region A stays
inactive (“free-rides”) and region B unilaterally sets the temperature distribution
(“free-drives”). We note that, depending on the realization of h,H, and Ĥ, the con-
straint that αA, αB < 1 will select a subdomain of the graphs shown in Figure 3.5
eliminating parts of the climate clash and free-driving domains by either reducing
the domain from above or from the right.
The strategic interactions characterize how the regions try to increase or defend
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Figure 3.5: The graph shows how the domain of Nash equilibria is affected by a
increase in the costs or damages of geoengineering (left graph), and an increase in
the cost or a decrease in the effectiveness of counter-geoengineering (right graph)
for region A.
their own well-being given the availability of geoengineering. We will now analyze
the implications for a region’s incentives to undertake classic climate change mitiga-
tion, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These incentives are characterized
by the regional SCCs, whose structure differs by type of equilibrium.



































































AA − εcA}, and dBA ∈
{dgBA, dcBA} depending on whether the corresponding region engages in geoengineer-
ing (g) or counter-geoengineering (c). Swapping region indices characterizes region
B’s SCC.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.8.
Before discussing the SCC-formulas in detail, we summarize some consequences
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The availability of geoengineering reduces the SCC of a unilaterally
acting region (similar to the global model). In all other equilibria, geoengineering
can either increase, decrease or leave the SCC unchanged relative to the regional
world without geoengineering, depending on the heterogeneity of damages and the
spillovers.
We note that the corresponding regional SCC in the absence of geoengineering
is given by the first two terms in square brackets (and coincides with setting the
geoengineering propensities to zero).
Unilateral action. If region B is inactive (SBt = 0), region A’s SCC has the
same structure as in the global model. In difference to the social planner, region A
only accounts for its own climate impact γA and for its own damages dgAA and costs
εgA. As in the global social planner case, the availability of geoengineering always
reduces the active region’s SCC.18
Inactive region. If region A is inactive (SAt = 0), the structure of its SCC
resembles that of the previous case where it is acting unilaterally. However, the
SCC is no longer driven by its own geoengineering specifiers zA and dAA but by





















> 0 always reduces the SCC.
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the spillovers resulting from region B, the geoengineering propensity αB zgB and
the damages dgBA. For most regions, the damage spillovers from a ton of sulfur
deployment in the other region are less than damages plus deployment costs from




A). Then, also the inactive region’s
SCC falls for a sufficiently low geoengineering propensity of the active region, i.e.,









γA. If the active region’s geoengineering propensity becomes
too high, region A’s spillover damages dominate its cooling benefits. Then, its SCC
increases under geoengineering because more CO2 emissions trigger more of the
(net-)damaging geoengineering. Eventually region A will abandon its passive role
and engage in counter-geoengineering.19
Both regions active: the spill-over term. If both regions are active (SAt 6= 0,
and SBt 6= 0), an additional term enters region A’s SCC. It results from the spill-
overs between regions A and B and we call it the






Climate-match. At the core of the spill-over term lie the excess costs dAA−dBA
from region A’s own as compared to region B’s geoengineering action. It captures
the difference between the marginal damages and deployment costs (dAA = dgAA+ε
g
A)
resulting from region A’s own cooling as compared to the marginal damages result-
ing from geoengineering in the other region (dgBA). If damages are independent
of where geoengineering is deployed, then excess costs equal the positive deploy-
ment costs εgA; as compared to unilateral action, region A benefits from B’s support

































We note that region A will move to the climate clash equilibrium before its SCC dominates that
of a world without geoengineering if spillover damages are very high and counter-geoengineering




in cooling the planet. The benefit from B’s engagement grows with the spill-over
weighted sulfur emissions of region B, αB
SBt (mt)
mt
, here expressed per unit of atmo-
spheric carbon. CO2 emissions increase the atmospheric carbon concentration and
trigger additional geoengineering in both regions. The spillover term represents the
benefits from the other region’s cooling support, which reduces the costs of (par-
tially) offsetting the damages from releasing a unit of CO2. In summary, possible
cost and damage savings from the other region’s cooling support can reduce the SCC.
If the spillover damages are substantially larger than a region’s self-imposed dam-
ages, e.g. because of the sulfur distribution and resulting acid rain patterns, then
excess costs are negative and the spillover term can also increase the region’s SCC.
For extremely heterogenous damages, the spillover term can dominate the (“unilat-
eral”) cooling term, increasing the SCC over the one prevailing in a world without
geoengineering, even in the climate match equilibrium.
Climate-clash. In the case where region A is cooling and region B engages in





over, the own excess costs dAA−dBA = dgAA+ε
g
A−dcBA are positive because region B’s
counter-geoengineering can at most offset damages in region A (Assumption 3.2).
As a result, the spill-over term always increases the SCC for the cooling country.
In the case where region A uses counter-geoengineering and region B is cooling,
SBt (mt)
mt
remains positive and the own excess costs dAA − dBA = dcAA − εcA − d
g
BA
turn negative as (now A’s) counter-geoengineering can at most offset the damages.
Again, the spillover term increases the SCC. Thus, in a climate clash, the spillover
always increases the SCC in both regions. The intuition is that the other region
always interferes with what a region would like to do if it was acting alone. This in-
terference grows stronger for higher CO2 concentrations, thereby increasing the cost
of emitting another ton of carbon. Depending on whether the positive spill-over
term dominates the reduction from cooling, the net effect on region A’s SCC can
be positive or negative, and therefore the SCC can be higher or lower compared to
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a regional world without geoengineering.
Figure 3.6 illustrates region A’s SCC across the different regions. On the
horizontal axis, we increase region B’s geoengineering propensity by varying dgBB.
As in Figure 3.4, region A’s geoengineering propensity and counter-geoengineering
aversion are fixed. Again, we set dcBB = 0.5 d
g





Choosing a simple example we let dgAA = d
g
BA. If B’s cooling propensity is sufficiently
small (zgB < ∆ zA ⇔ zcB < αA z
g
A), region A is cooling and region B uses counter-
geoengineering. As a result, the spillover contribution in region A’s SCC is positive;
the clash between the regions grows with each unit of carbon emissions raising
their social costs. As region B’s reluctance to engage in counter-geoengineering




B → ∆ zA), this spillover effect declines, implying that
A’s SCC falls. Once the counter-geoengineering reluctance of region B matches the
spillover-weighted geoengineering propensity of region A (zcB = αA z
g
A), region B
turns inactive (SBt = 0). Then, A’s SCC remains constant because it is independent
of region B’s characteristics; region A does as it pleases with no interference from the
other region, strategic interactions are absent. Once also region B’s geoengineering
propensity matches region A’s spillover-weighted propensity (zgB = αA z
g
A), region B
starts cooling. The spillover effect in region A’s SCC turns negative (dAA − dBA =
εgA > 0). As a result, region A’s SCC decreases; the impact of an additional unit of
carbon emitted by region A will increasingly be offset by region B’s cooling (saving




B region A becomes
inactive. From this point onward, only region B cools. The SCC of region A







n .20 Afterwards, A’s SCC begins to
rise. Finally, when zgB → zcA α
−1
B region A starts to engage in counter-geoengineering.




























since dgBA = d
g
AA. Moreover, the unilateral action equilibrium with S
A
t = 0 requires z
g
A ≤ αB z
g
B .
Thus, SCCA declines in the non-empty zgB-interval where z
g












Figure 3.6: The graph shows region A’s SCC as a function of region B’s geoengi-
neering propensity zgB (by varying d
g





defined ∆ zA = αA zgA − (zcB − z
g
B).
3.3.3 Rest of the world
We discussed the strategic geoengineering and mitigation decisions in technologi-
cally advanced and politically powerful regions that are willing and able to engage
in climate engineering. The large part of the world will not be able or willing to
perform such planetary alterations. Yet, even a single region’s activity will change
the mitigation incentives around the globe. This section discusses how the availabil-
ity of geoengineering (and possibly counter-geoengineering) for some region changes
the mitigation incentives around the world.
The “rest of the world” does not engage in climate engineering and affects regions
A and B only indirectly through its emissions and the resulting changes of atmo-
spheric carbon concentrations affecting geoengineering levels. The rest of the world
has an aggregate economy similar to that of regions A and B with idiosyncratic
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production function, damages, and resulting capital and emission dynamics. We
denote the sulfur related geoengineering damages (or damage reductions) caused to
the rest of the world by region i ∈ {A,B} through its deployment of sulfur (or the
counter-geoengineering agent) by diW ∈ {dgiW , dciW}. If region i remains inactive,
the respective damage parameter is zero. The resulting overall damages incurred
by the rest of the world, as a fraction of its output, are
DWt (τ
B






− (dBWSBt + dAW αA SAt )− aW (mt − 1)
]
.
As we assumed that the rest of the world is part of climate zone B, we also
assume that sulfur levels are the same as in region B, including both local deploy-
ment SBt and spillovers αA SAt from region A. We now characterize the impact of
geoengineering on the mitigation incentives in the rest of world.
Proposition 3.6. If region i ∈ {A,B} acts unilaterally, the SCC in the rest of the
















where z = αA zgA for i = A (other climate zone active) and z = z
g
B for i = B (same
climate zone active). If both regions are active (SAt 6= 0 and SBt 6= 0), the SCC in


















with zA ∈ {zcA, z
g
A}, zB ∈ {zcB, z
g
B}, dAW ∈ {dcAW , d
g
AW}, and dBW ∈ {dcBW , d
g
BW}.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.9.
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The structure of the SCC in the rest of the world is similar to that of the active
regions discussed in Proposition 3.5. As in the previous section, the first two con-
tributions characterize the SCC in the absence of geoengineering, and a similar
corollary follows.
Corollary 2. The availability of geoengineering in regions A and B can increase,
decrease or leave the SCC in the rest of the world unchanged relative to the regional
world without geoengineering.
One region acts unilaterally. If only one region is active, the SCC in the rest
of the world is the exact analogue of that of the inactive region in Proposition 3.5.
The one difference lies not in the structure of the SCC, but in the fact that the rest
of the world will not match the cooling no matter how beneficial, and it will not be
able to engage in counter-geoengineering no matter how damaging geoengineering
is. As a result, if climate engineering is beneficial, the rest of the world can free-
ride much more than a region with geoengineering potential (it has the credible
“strategy” not to engage). But it can also be hit by geoengineering without any
ability to respond. As we point out in section 3.3.2, avoiding the climate clash does
not have to be a good thing; the clash allows both regions to get close to their
desired climate targets. Without the ability to clash, the rest of the world is forced
to inhabit an unfavorable environment.
Without loss of generality we assume that region A is the active region. If the
rest of the world’s benefit-cost ratio of (passively incurred) geoengineering exceeds

















then the rest of
world benefits from geoengineering; its marginal cost of emitting carbon is reduced












A > 0. Unsurprisingly, this
reduction grows with climate impact γW in the rest of the world and falls with
the incurred geoengineering damages dgAW . We note that the benefit-cost ratio
of geoengineering for the active region has to account for the deployment costs
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εgA and the decreasing effectiveness of geoengineering
21 both of which are absent
for the passive region. Thus, if the regions are somewhat symmetric, the rest of
the world will tend to benefit (in the short run) from geoengineering and, as a
consequence, increase its CO2 emissions (worsening the long-run situation). We
could consider this result a formal version of the slippery slope argument, which
warns that going down the road of geoengineering makes us emit more and, thereby,
makes us increasingly dependent on geoengineering.22 We point out that even a
rest of the world that has no interest in ever engaging in climate engineering can
make this slope a lot more slippery if only some country is willing to engage in
geoengineering. Slipping becomes worse the higher the assumed effectiveness of the
cooling, the higher the climate damages, and the lower the geoengineering damages
to other regions.
However, it is reasonable to assume that the incentive to do climate engineer-
ing are largest for those countries that benefit the most. If the benefit-cost ratio
and, thus, geoengineering propensity of the active region is much higher than in the
rest of the world, the above inequalities flip and the SCC in the rest of the world
increases, making CO2 emissions even more pricey than in the absence of geoengi-
neering. Then the slippery slope argument turns around, at least on the planetary
scale. While the active region slides it down a little bit, overall emissions decrease
(also) to avoid more geoengineering damages from the unilaterally cooling region,
and as global emissions decrease, also the cooling region will voluntarily reduce its
geoengineering level.
Climate match. With both regions active, the SCC in the rest of the world
resembles that of the active regions (see Proposition 3.5). However, the rest of
the world does not participate in the costly cooling. If its marginal damages from
21Sulfur deployment scales with the CO2 concentrations. The active decision maker takes the
decreasing effectiveness of sulfur into account and, therefore, has a higher opportunity cost of
sulfur deployment.
22And maybe even worse, merely expecting that some region will engage in geoengineering in
the future, already reduces the expected damages from today’s emissions, thereby increasing the
pressure to truly engaging in geoengineering in the future.
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geoengineering are independent of the origin, dgBW = d
g
AW , then the spillover term
is zero. In this case, the situation is identical to the scenario of unilateral ac-
tion. The rest of the world does not care whether one or both regions engage in
geoengineering. Moreover, its SCC reduction (or increase) is proportional to the
geoengineering propensity of region B, which shares the climate zone and sets the
“local” climate target. If both active regions have similar geoengineering propen-
sities and the marginal damages from geoengineering in region A are lower than
those from geoengineering in region B, then the spillover term will reduce the rest
of the world’s SCC relative to that based on region B’s unilateral action.
Climate clash. If region A cools and region B engages in counter-geoengineering,
then αA(zgA − αB zcB) > 0. Provided that counter-geoengineering cannot perfectly
offset the damages from geoengineering, dcBW < d
g
AW , the spillover term increases
the SCC. In the opposite scenario where region B cools and region A engages in
counter-geoengineering, αA(zcA − αB z
g




AW . Again, the spill-
over term is positive and increases the SCC. Thus, in a climate clash the spill-over
term is always positive, and increases the SCC in the rest of the world. If region B
cools and region A is countering it, then the positive spill-over term increases the
SCC compared to case where region B acts unilaterally. If geoengineering damages
from region B’s cooling are high and the effectiveness from counter-geoengineering
is low, the SCC in the rest of the world can be higher than in a world without geo-
engineering, helping to turn the slippery of geoengineering uphill increasing global
mitigation.23
3.3.4 Heat transfer
This section lifts Assumption 3.3 of the baseline model, introducing direct heat
exchange between the regions; temperature change in one region now directly af-
23The climate clash equilibrium where SAt < 0 and SBt > 0 requires zcA − αB z
g
B < 0
























fects the temperature in the other region. As a result, we find adjustments to the
geoengineering targets as well as the strategic interactions. Propositions 3.7 states
that under according modifications of the geoengineering propensity (and counter-
geoengineering reluctance), Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 characterizing the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium remain valid. Proposition 3.8 shows how heat transfers
alter the SCC.
In our baseline model, interaction between regions was reduced to the spill-over
of the cooling sulfur deployment (or counter-geoengineering agent). Now, cooling
one region also directly alters the temperature in the other region, even without
sulfur spill-over, a natural consequence of heat exchange across the globe.
Proposition 3.7. With heat transfers, Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 remain valid under
the following modifications of the definitions of the geoengineering propensities zgA
and counter-geoengineering reluctance zcA:
If (i) SBt = 0, then
zgA =
(







and if (ii) SBt 6= 0, then
zgA =
(




















A) + γA f2 + αA γ
heat
A f2,
bA = αA(1− n)f3 γheatA , δcA = (dcAA − εcA) + γA f2 + αA γheatA f2,
and direct climate change impact γA ≡ βA ξA0 σ̃A11 σforc, as well as heat transfer driven
climate change impact γheatA ≡ βA ξA0 σ̃A12 σforc. Swapping region indices characterizes
region B’s strategies.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.6.
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The new term γheatA reflects the climate change impact from heat exchange with






counted long-term heat flux from region B to region A resulting from a present
heating (forcing) change in region B. This heat exchange affects both, heat increase
as a result of greenhouse gas emissions and heat reduction as a result of geoengi-
neering.
We note that the geoengineering propensities and counter-geoengineering reluc-
tance without heat transfers (γheatA = 0) in Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 are simply













where aA captures sulfur’s direct cooling efficiency f3 in region A, and the damage
impact of global warming γA, both of which increase the region’s geoengineering
propensity. The component δgA captures the damages from and costs of geoengineer-
ing, which reduces the geoengineering propensity (as well as a negligible efficiency
loss in forcing captured by the close-to-zero f2, which here gains an additional term
capturing heat spill-over from region B caused by region A’s cooling). Comparing
a model with heat transfer to one without heat transfers implies a re-calibration of
the heat transfer matrix σ. In order to describe the same equilibrium temperature
response, the matrix elements [(1− σ)−1]ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} have to coincide. For
perfectly patient decision makers, this condition implies that the parameters σ̃ij
and, thus, γA, γB are directly comparable across models. For the impatient deci-
sion maker, the climate impact parameters γA, γB would slightly differ, a minor
difference that we ignore in the subsequent discussion.
One active region. If only region A is active, the geoengineering propensity
increases by the term bAα−nA , where bA is the heat transfer benefit. It character-
izes the climate–impact–γA–weighted cooling benefits in region A that result from
its cooling of region B through sulfur spill-overs αA at efficiency f3. These spill-
overs then feed back into region A through the heat transfer captured in σ̃A12. The
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geoengineering propensity adjustment weighs this heat transfer benefit by α−nA . A
higher sulfur spill-over has two implications. First, it increases the marginal benefit
from deploying sulfur through the heat transfer benefit (part of bA). But second, it
also implies that the level of sulfur in region B is already high, and the effectiveness
of deploying yet another ton of sulfur to cool region B is lower. The net effect of
the spill-over αA on the additional geoengineering propensity as a result of heat
transfer is positive (α−nA αA = α
1−n
A , which increases in αA), but it is lower than
one might expect when merely considering the heat transfer benefits. It might be
more intuitive to call this (negative) heat transfer a “cooling transfer”. In summary,
under unilateral action, the cooling transfer gives the region an additional incentive
for cooling as it benefits from the global forcing impact of its sulfur deployment.
Both regions cooling. With two active regions, strategic effects set in. We
focus on the additional strategic effects implied by heat transfer. Other strategic
implications discussed in Proposition 3.3 apply alongside. We explain the adjust-
ment of the geoengineering propensity in case (ii) in two steps. First, we assume
that region B does not experience any heat transfer benefit (bB = 0). Then, region





n as in the case without heat
transfer. Region A increases its geoengineering propensity according to the con-
tribution bA δBaB ; its geoengineering increases in response to a higher heat transfer
benefit bA, but less so if region B already has a high geoengineering propensity,
which reduces the efficiency of additional cooling.24 Second, let us turn back on
region B’s heat transfer benefit bB. Now also region B benefits from the cooling in
region A. Similarly to region A in the first case, it will ramp up sulfur deployment.
Anticipating this response of region B, region A lowers its own target as captured by
the term bA bBaB . This strategic “free-riding” response increases in the heat transfer
benefit (connectedness) of both regions.25 A short calculation shows that region





falls in region B’s geoengineering propensity zgB .
25This additional “free-riding” as a result of heat transfer falls in aB , which characterizes the
climate impact weighted cooling efficiency within region B. A higher aB relative to bB makes region
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A’s cooling increases as a result of heat (or cooling) transfer, if its own benefit-cost
ratio before heat transfer aA
δgA
is larger than the spill-over benefit over region B’s geo-
engineering damages bA
δgB
.26 In summary, the heat transfer increases the incentive for
cooling. With both regions cooling, efficiency loss and free-riding incentive counter
this additional cooling incentive. A region’s cooling incentive increases overall un-
der heat transfer whenever its benefit-cost ratio without heat transfers exceeds the
spill-over benefits to other region’s costs ratio (otherwise the free-riding incentive
will dominate).
Counter-geoengineering. Now, let us consider the climate clash scenario
where region B cools, and region A deploys the counter-geoengineering agent. Fol-
lowing the two step interpretation, first, suppose region B does not experience






n . Region A’s reluctance to engage in counter-geoengineering
increases (=less counter-geoengineering) with heat transfer as the denominator in
zcA decreases by the term bA
δB
aB
; region A gets more cooling for less damages and
results less contrarian to region B’s cooling. We note that the reluctance to counter-
geoengineering is more sensitive to heat transfers than the geoengineering propensity
in the case above where both regions are cooling since δcA > δ
g
A. Second, turning on
heat transfer for region B (bB > 0) leads to an increase in region B’s geoengineering
propensity (as in the case above). Region A anticipates the reaction of region B and




The strategic component renders the regions more contrarian under heat transfers.
Overall, the effect of heat transfer on deployment levels depends on the cost-benefit
B relatively less responsive to switching on heat transfer. Then, region A lowers its geoengineering
propensity less than in the case where it anticipates a stronger response of region B.














































. Thus, a decrease in both regions’ propensities cannot occur.
87
ratios of geoengineering and counter-geoengineering, and the heat benefits in both
regions. If heat transfer increases region B’s propensity to cool and decreases region
A’s counter-geoengineering reluctance, both regions increase their deployment levels
(the climate clash gets worse). The opposite occurs if heat transfer decreases region
B’s propensity and increase A’s reluctance. In this case, both regions lower their de-
ployment levels, and the climate clash turns less extreme. If heat transfer increases
region B’s cooling propensity, and increases region A’s reluctance the net effect on
deployment levels is ambiguous. We note that a decrease in the geoengineering
propensity of region B and a decrease in the counter-geoengineering reluctance of
region A cannot occur in combination.27 In summary, in the clash scenario, the
non-strategic implications of heat transfer reduce counter-geoengineering. However,
they also increase the cooling region’s geoengineering propensity. Thus, the strategic
incentives boost the clash. Overall, heat transfer can both turn the climate clash
worse or improve the situation, depending on the regions’ cost-benefit ratios for
geoengineering and counter-geoengineering.
We now derive the regional SCC characterizing the mitigation implications of
heat exchange. We focus on the new contributions resulting from heat exchange and
abbreviate the original SCC formula of our baseline model as SCCAw/o(·), indicating
as arguments the engineering propensities on which it depends. These propensities
change as discussed above, whereas the structure of SCCAw/o(·) remains identical to
that observed in Proposition 3.5.





























, and decreases if aAδcA ≤
bB
δgB
. Assuming σ̃i11 > σ̃i12 implies γi > γheati , and thus ai > bi







cannot occur in combination since
the former implies aB
δgB
< aAδcA
and the latter implies aB
δgB
> aAδcA
. Thus, a decrease in region B’s
geoengineering propensity cannot occur in combination with a decrease in region A’s counter-
geoengineering reluctance.
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If both regions are active (SBt 6= 0 and SAt 6= 0) the SCC is















with zA ∈ {zcA, z
g
A}, and zB ∈ {zcB, z
g
B}, depending on whether the corresponding
region engages in geoengineering (g) or counter-geoengineering (c). Swapping region
indices characterizes region B’s SCC. We note that Corollary 1 from the base model
still holds.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.3.8.
All cases still contain the original terms abbreviated by SCCAw/o(·). Their con-
tributions depends on the geoengineering propensities and counter-geoengineering
reluctancies, which now change because of the strategical responses to heat transfer
that we discussed above in Proposition 3.7. In addition, heat transfer introduces
two new terms. The first in the square brackets reflects the heat flow across regions
related to greenhouse gas emissions. It is positive and increases in γheatA characteriz-
ing the heat transfer based climate change impact. This contribution also arises in
a regional model with heat flows but without geoengineering. Other damage terms
are absent because heat transfer does not affect ocean acidification or sulfur-based
damages. The second term in the square brackets is negative and reflects the cooling
from geoengineering under heat transfer.
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3.4 Summary and conclusions
We have introduced solar geoengineering into a state of the art integrated assessment
model of climate change. For this purpose, we found a new solution class to closed-
form dynamic models which allows us to incorporate the current scientific knowledge
about the radiative forcing response to stratospheric sulfur injections.
The global model shows that the social planner’s optimal sulfur deployment is
very sensitive to potential damages from geoengineering, which are mostly unknown.
The size of the SCC reduction increases in the sulfur-based cooling efficiency and
falls with geoengineering damages. We find that the SCC reduction is less responsive
to geoengineering damages than is the geoengineering activity. Solar geoengineering
could cut the SCC into half if damages turn out negligible. However, current damage
guesstimates would reduce the globally optimal SCC by only 12-22%.
Our strategic model assumes that regional deployment follows a linear Markov
strategy, which coincides with the unique optimal course of action of a global plan-
ner. We analytically characterize the regional strategies and identify three qualita-
tively distinct types of equilibria; unilateral action where only one region is active,
a climate match where both regions cool the world, and a climate clash where one
region cools and the other region engages in a counter-measure. We show that these
equilibria are mutually exclusive and depend on the regions’ damage characteristics.
Further, we analyze how changes in geoengineering damages and the effectiveness
of counter-measures affect the equilibria domains.
If the active regions are somewhat symmetric, they will both contribute to the
global cooling. As they become heterogeneous, the region with lower climate dam-
ages or higher geoengineering damages will increasingly free-ride on the other re-
gion’s actions. Given its ability to free-ride, the region’s SCC will fall and it will
emit more greenhouse gases as compared to a situation where the regions are sym-
metric. Eventually, the free-riding region will stop to contribute entirely. In this
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equilibria, there exists a small domain where its SCC decreases further until the in-
active region reaches its free-riding “bliss point”. As the regions’ benefit-cost ratios
of geoengineering become more asymmetric, the free-riding region will eventually
start to dislike the active region’s cooling. Initially, it is still better off than in a
world without cooling, but it will already make use of the option to neutralize some
of the active region’s cooling, if costs for the counter-measure are sufficiently low.
In this case, we call the active region a free-driver. It imposes a special type of
externality on the other region. The overall externality on the inactive region is
positive, however, the marginal externality is negative. Eventually, as the climate
clash gets more extreme, also the overall externality turns negative.
For simplicity of presentation, we first limited the interactions to cooling spill-
overs. We then show that introducing heat transfer leaves the qualitative results
unchanged, but adds two additional layers. First, heat exchange gives rise to two
additional terms in the SCC. Second, heat exchange increases a region’s incentive
to cool the planet because it benefits not only from its own direct cooling, but also
from the spill-over cooling in the neighboring regions. Under unilateral action, heat
transfer therefore increases a region’s cooling incentive. However, if both regions
are active, they anticipate the other’s response, resulting in a free-riding incentive
that reduces or even inverts the original incentive to do more.
The rest of the world, which is either not willing or has not the ability to en-
gineer the planet’s climate, will always be able to free-ride, but never be able to
counter. Thus, the rest of the world has more to gain from having similar geoengi-
neering preferences as an active region and more to lose from being dissimilar. This
powerfully represents a version of the slippery slope argument. A single region’s
cooling action can reduce the mitigation incentives, represented by the SCC, in all
or large parts of the rest of the world, which will further increase the geoengineering
level of the active region. However, it is reasonable to assume that the incentives
to engage in climate engineering are largest for regions that benefit the most. If
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these regions have a sufficiently higher benefit-cost ratio of geoengineering than the
rest of the world, the SCC in large parts of the world increases. As a result CO2
emissions become even more pricey than in the absence of geoengineering, turning
the slippery slope of geoengineering uphill. Such a mitigation enhancing implica-
tion of geoengineering can arise in all three types of equilibria. As overall emissions
decrease (also) to avoid more geoengineering, the active regions voluntarily scale
down their efforts.
Last, we note that our framework permits the introduction of uncertainty, which
is ubiquitous in the economics of geoengineering (Heutel et al., 2018; Emmerling
and Tavoni, 2018a). Numeric assessment of the uncertainty in regional (including
strategic) models is severely challenged by the curse of dimensionality in dynamic
programming. Our analytic model will be able to integrate uncertainty into the
high-dimensions space of a regional integrated assessment model, even though we
currently have to leave it for future work.
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B.1 Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1.1 Further results on radiative forcing
Model data from Kleinschmitt et al. (2018). Figure 3.7 shows approximated radia-
tive forcing Ft as a 3D function of the relative atmospheric carbon concentration mt and
sulfur injections St.
Figure 3.7: Radiative forcing Ft as a function of the relative atmospheric carbon
concentration mt and sulfur injections St.
Model data from Niemeier and Schmidt (2017). We also calibrate radiative forc-
ing equation Ft to data from Niemeier and Schmidt (2017) over the relative atmospheric
carbon interval mt ∈ [1.5, 3]. Table 3.6 shows that the estimated forcing parameters also
fulfill Assumption 3.1.
Table 3.6: Estimated forcing parameters
f0 f1 f2 f3 n
0.4 2.9 0.004 2.08 0.9
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Figure 3.8 shows approximated radiative forcing based on the data from Niemeier and
Schmidt (2017) as a function of sulfur injections (left graph), and as a function of the
relative atmospheric carbon concentration (right graph).
Figure 3.8: Approximation of radiative forcing Ft to model data (shown by cross
markers) from Niemeier and Schmidt (2017) for sulfur injections between 4 and 50
TgS, and positive radiative forcing levels. The left graph shows radiative forcing
as a function of sulfur for different atmospheric carbon concentrations. The right
graph shows radiative forcing as a function of the atmospheric carbon concentration
for different sulfur injection rates.
B.1.2 Global model
B.1.2.1 Solving the Bellman equation
Definitions. We note that aggregate capital Kt =
∑IK
i=1Ki,t and that the share of capital
in industry i is Ki,t = Ki,tKt . We define the consumption rate as
xt =
Ct
Yt [1−Dt (T1,t, Gt(St),mt)]
.
Homogeneity of the production function implies
Yt = F(At, Kt, N t, Et) = Kκt F(At, Kt, N t, Et),
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such that
logCt = log xt + κ logKt + logF(At, Kt, N t, Et) + ξ0 (1− τ1,t)− dSt − a(mt − 1).
We transform the optimization problem into its dynamic programming form (Bellman
equation)
V (kt, τ t,M t,Rt, t) = max
xt,N t,Kt,Et,St
{
log xt + κ kt + logF(At, Kt, N t, Et)
+ ξ0 (1− τ1,t)− dSt − a(mt − 1) + β V (kt+1, τ t+1,M t+1,Rt+1, t+ 1)
}
where kt = logKt with the equation of motion
kt+1 = κ kt + logF(At, Kt, N t, Et) + log(1− xt) + ξ0 (1− τ1,t)− dSt − a(mt − 1).
(3.19)
The linear affine guess for the value function
V (kt, τ t,M t,Rt, t) = ϕk kt +ϕ
T




R,tRt + ϕt (3.20)
turns the Bellman equation into the form
ϕk kt +ϕ
T












Ki,t) + λNt (1−
IN∑
i=1
Ni,t) + β ϕk
(
















We show that the system is linear in states and that the affine value function, (3.20),
solves the system. Inserting the trial solution and the next periods states (equations 3.7,
102
3.9, 3.10b and 3.19) into the Bellman equation delivers
ϕk kt +ϕ
T












Ki,t) + λNt (1−
IN∑
i=1
Ni,t) + β ϕk
(






















= 0 =⇒ xt =
1
1 + β ϕk
. (3.21)
Maximizing the right hand side over Ki,t yields
(1 + β ϕk)
∂F(At,Kt,N t,Et)
∂Ki,t
F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
= λKt
which is equivalent to
Ki,t =
σY,Ki(At, Kt, N t, Et)
IK∑
i=1
σY,Ki(At, Kt, N t, Et)
with
σY,Ki(At, Kt, N t, Et) ≡
∂F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
∂Ki,t
Ki,t
F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
.
Similarly, the first order conditions for the labor input is
(1 + β ϕk)
∂F(At,Kt,N t,Et)
∂Ni,t





σY,Ni(At, Kt, N t, Et)
IN∑
i=1
σY,Ni(At, Kt, N t, Et)
with
σY,Ni(At, Kt, N t, Et) ≡
∂F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
∂Ni,t
Ni,t
F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
The first order condition for the optimal input of fossil fuels is given by
(1 + β ϕk)
∂F(At,Kt,N t,Et)
∂Ei,t
F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
= β(ϕR,i,t+1 − ϕM1)
which is equivalent to
Ei,t =
(1 + β ϕk)σY,Ei(At, Kt, N t, Et)
β(ϕR,i,t+1 − ϕM1)
with
σY,Ei(At, Kt, N t, Et) ≡
∂F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
∂Ei,t
Ei,t
F(At, Kt, N t, Et)
.
So far, our results are equivalent to those of the ACE model. Next, we spell out the part
of the Bellman equation that depends on sulfur
Bt = β ϕτ1 σforc(f2 St − f3mnt S1−nt )− (1 + β ϕk) dSt
and find the first order condition for optimal sulfur deployment
β ϕτ1 σforc(f2 + (n− 1)f3mnt S−nt )− (1 + β ϕk) d = 0.
104
Solving the first order condition for St gives the optimal level of sulfur deployment
S∗t =
(
β ϕτ1 σforc (n− 1)f3






Solving the system of first order conditions gives us N∗t (At, ϕk,ϕM ,ϕR,t+1),
K∗t (At, ϕk,ϕM ,ϕR,t+1), and E∗t (At, ϕk,ϕM ,ϕR,t+1) which are independent of the states
and S∗t (ϕk, ϕτ1,M1,t) which depends on the atmospheric carbon stock. In the following
we show that given these optimal controls the maximized Bellman equation is linear in all
states.









= log x∗t + κ kt + logF(At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t ) + ξ0 (1− τ1,t)− dS∗t − a(mt − 1) + β ϕk
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κ kt



































f1 + f2 z − f3 z1−n
)











Rt + log x
∗
t + β ϕk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + β ϕk) logF(At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t )
+ (1 + β ϕk)(ξ0 + a) + β ϕτ1 σforc f0 + βϕ
T
M ẽt − βϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
+ β ϕt+1. (3.23)
The system is linear in all states. Deriving both sides of the equation with respect to
capital, kt, yields




Inserting ϕk into equation (3.21) yield the optimal consumption rate x∗t = 1− β κ.
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Coefficient matching with respect to transformed temperatures delivers
ϕTτ = −ξ0 (1 + β ϕk) eT1 (1− β σ)−1,
where we denote the entries of the inverted matrix as follows











where [·]1,1 denotes the first element of the inverted matrix in square brackets. Hence,
ϕτ1 = −ξ0 (1 + β ϕk)σ̃11. (3.26)





f1 + f2 z − f3 z1−n
)




















where again [·]1,1 denotes the first element of the inverted matrix in square brackets.
Coefficient matching with respect to the resource stock yields
ϕTR,t = βϕ
T
R,t+1 ⇔ ϕR,t = β−tϕR,0 (Hotelling’s rule).
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The initial resource values ϕTR,0 depend on the set up of the economy, including assump-
tions about production and the energy sector. Given the coefficients and the optimal rate
of consumption equation (3.23) turns to the following condition:
ϕt − β ϕt+1 = log x∗t + β ϕk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + β ϕk) logF(At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t )
+ (1 + β ϕk)(ξ0 + a) + β ϕτ1 σforc f0 + βϕ
T
M ẽt − βϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
This condition will be satisfied by picking the sequence ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, ... The additional
condition limt→∞ βtV (·) = 0⇒ limt→∞ βtϕt = 0 pins down this initial value ϕ0.
B.1.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
In Appendix B.1.2.1 we have shown that the optimal level of sulfur is given by
S∗t =
(
(n− 1)β ϕτ1 σforc f3




The endogenous shadow value of capital ϕk > 0 is positive (see 3.24), while the endoge-
nous shadow value of (transformed) temperature is negative ϕτ1 < 0 (a bad, see 3.26).
Therefore, both numerator and denominator are positive. The optimal level of sulfur de-
ployment increases in the absolute value of the shadow price of atmospheric temperature.
Inserting (3.24) and (3.26) for the shadow values ϕτ1 and ϕk into our expression for
sulfur deployment (3.29) and using the definition γ = β ξ0 σ̃11 σforc delivers
S∗t =
(





The parameter σ̃11 is defined as in (3.25). Inserting the fit parameters from Table 3.2, and
using the parameter values from the baseline calibration of the ACE model (re-calibrated








B.1.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Inserting equation (3.26) for the shadow value ϕτ1 (using γ = β ξ0 σ̃11 σforc) into equation
(3.27) for the shadow value of the atmospheric carbon stock delivers




f1 + f2 z − f3 z1−n
)
+ a+ d z
)
M−1pre φ̃11.







f1 + f2 z − f3 z1−n
)
+ a+ d z
)
M−1pre φ̃11.
The SCC is the negative of the shadow value of atmospheric carbon stock expressed in
money-measured consumption units,

















B.1.3.1 Climate dynamics and geoengineering damages
















































































where σAA = 1− σAB − σAO − σforc, σBB = 1− σBA − σBO − σforc, and σOO = 1− σOA − σOB .
We define transformed temperatures τA1,t = exp(ξ1 TA1,t), τB1,t = exp(ξ1 TB1,t), and τ2,t =
exp(ξ1 T2,t) with ξ1 = log 2s .
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τ t+1 = σ
Aτ t + F̃ t, with F̃ t =













To preserve symmetry in notation, we define the corresponding matrix σB by swapping
the first and second rows and columns, characterizing the identical dynamics from the
perspective of region B.
































M t+1 = ΦM t + ẽt.
Regional geoengineering damages. We define damages for region B symmetric to
damages for region A, which we defined in the main part of the paper. Thus, damages for
region B as a fraction of output are given by
DBt (τ
B


















dcBB − εcB for SBt < 0




dgAB for αA S
A
t > 0
dcAB for αA S
A
t < 0
0 for αA SAt = 0.
B.1.3.2 Bellman equation and Markov strategies
We show the existence of linear Markov strategies Sit(mt) = sitmt for i ∈ {A,B} forming
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Bellman equation. In the following we show for region A that the system is linear
in states and that the affine value function





















solves the system. The proof for region B is analogous. We suppress regional indices when
there is no ambiguity to ease notation. We denote region A’s shadow price for temperature
τA1,t in region A by ϕAAτ1 , and region A’s shadow price for temperature τB1,t in region B by
ϕBAτ1 . Inserting the trial solution and the equations of motion for the next period’s states
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into the Bellman equation delivers
ϕAk kt +ϕ
T















t (mt)− aA (mt − 1) + λKt (1−
IK∑
i=1





























First order conditions (apart from geoengineering). The first order conditions for
xt,N t,Kt,Et are structurally the same as in the global model.
Optimal response functions: collecting terms. The optimal (counter-) geoengi-
neering deployment has to be compatible with the assumed strategies of both regions.
Region A takes region B’s strategy as given while maximizing its welfare over its own
sulfur deployment (or, for SAt < 0 counter-geoengineering agent). The part of the r.h.s.
Bellman equation depending on sulfur is
BAnc(mt, S
A
t ) ≡ βA ϕAAτ1 F̃At (SAt , SBt (mt)) + βA ϕBAτA F̃Bt (SAt , SBt (mt))
−(1 + βA ϕAk )[dAASAt + dBA αB SBt (mt)]
=
[
βA ϕAAτ1 σforc f2 + β






βA ϕAAτ1 σforc f2 αB + β
A ϕBAτ1 σforc f2 − (1 + βA ϕAk )αBdBA
]
SBt (mt)
−βA ϕAAτ1 σforc f3mnt (SAt + αB SBt (mt))1−n
−βA ϕBAτ1 σforc f3mnt (SBt (mt) + αA SAt )1−n. (3.32)
We note that only the term δ̃A depends on the damage term dAA, which discretely switches
sign and magnitude as the region changes action between counter-geoengineering, no ac-
tion, and geoengineering at SAt = 0. All other terms are continuous. Given dAA multiplies
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SAt , also the term δ̃ASAt remains continuous. The shadow prices of a temperature increase
ϕiτ1 < 0, i ∈ {AA,BA} are negative, therefore, δ̃A > 0.





















We note that ãA, b̃A > 0 because n < 1 and the shadow prices of a temperature increase
are negative. Moreover recall that region A takes region B’s strategy SBt (mt) = sBt mt as































A)−n − δ̃A. (3.33)
Strict concavity. The second order derivative in SAt is strictly negative so that the
function BAnc(mt, SAt ) is strictly concave at all points of continuity. We still have to check
the discontinuity at SAt = 0 (⇔ sA = 0). The left and right limits of the objective

























where δ̃A ∈ {δ̃gA, δ̃cA} was defined in equation (3.32) and depends on damages dAA. The
superindex on δ̃cA refers to the case of counter-geoengineering where S
A
t < 0 and dAA ≡
dcAA − εcA, and δ̃
g
A refers to the case of (sulfur-based) geoengineering where S
A
t > 0 and






AA by Assumption 3.2 and because operational cost of


















Therefore, the function BAnc(mt, SAt ) has a concave kink at SAt = 0.
112
Three qualitatively distinct response functions SAt = mt s
A
t . We have the












−n − δ̃cA < 0 then sA, SAt < 0,






























−n − δ̃gA > 0 then s
A, SAt > 0,
an interior optimum exists to the right of the kink, and the region engages in geoengineer-
ing.
Thus, region A’s strategy is SAt = sAmt, consistent with our assumption that both
regions follow a climate engineering strategy proportional to the CO2 concentration mt.
We obtain the same result for region B by exchanging region labels.
Equilibrium strategies. We now solve for the proportionality constants si, i ∈
{A,B}, characterized by the optimality conditions above, such that the regions’ strategies
are mutually best responses.
(i) Let SAt 6= 0 and SBt 6= 0. Then we have shown that the optimal responses follow
from the interior solution to the first order condition of equation (3.33)
(n− 1)βA ϕAAτ1 σforc f3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ ãA > 0
(sA+αB s
B)−n+(n− 1)βA ϕBAτ1 σforc f3 αA︸ ︷︷ ︸




(n− 1)βB ϕBBτ1 σforc f3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ ãB > 0
(sB+αA s
A)−n+(n− 1)βB ϕABτ1 σforc f3 αB︸ ︷︷ ︸





Similarly as for region A, we denoted the shadow price of region B for temperature τB1,t by
ϕBBτ1 , and the shadow price of region B for temperature τA1,t by ϕABτ1 . Rearranging (3.35)
leads to
(sA + αB s
B)−n =
δ̃B − ãB(sB + αA sA)−n
b̃B
Using this result in (3.34) yields
(sB + αA s
A)−n =
δ̃A b̃B − ãA δ̃B
b̃A b̃B − ãA ãB
.
From this we get
sB =
(
δ̃A b̃B − ãA δ̃B







δ̃B b̃A − ãB δ̃A








[( δ̃A b̃B − ãA δ̃B






( δ̃B b̃A − ãB δ̃A










[( δ̃B b̃A − ãB δ̃A






( δ̃A b̃B − ãA δ̃B









( δ̃B b̃A − ãB δ̃gA
b̃B b̃A − ãB ãA
)− 1
n for SAt > 0
zcA =
( δ̃B b̃A − ãB δ̃cA
b̃B b̃A − ãB ãA
)− 1







zgA − αB zB
)






zcA − αB zB
)
for SAt < 0
(ii) In the second case where SAt > 0 and SBt = 0, the first order condition for region A
simplifies to
ãA (s
A)−n + b̃A(αA s
A)−n − δ̃gA = 0























(iii) The last possible case is SAt = 0 and SBt > 0, which is symmetric to case (ii).
Summary of strategies. In conclusion, the following reaction functions characterize
a Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game: If SBt = 0, region A chooses SAt = z
g
Amt and if





zgA − αB zB
)





zcA − αB zB
)
for SAt < 0
SAt = 0 otherwise.
115
Swapping country indices characterizes region B’s strategies.
B.1.3.3 Verifying solution to the Bellman equation.







k ,ϕMA,ϕR,t+1), and S
A∗
t (mt), which are analogous to the global solutions char-
acterized in equations (3.21) to (3.22), into the maximized Bellman equation (3.31) yields
ϕAk kt +ϕ
T











t (mt) + dBA αB S
B
t (mt)
− aA (mt − 1) + βA ϕAk
(

























+ βA ϕt+1 (3.36)
where F̃ t is the forcing vector defined in equation (3.30) making its sulfur dependencies
explicit. Arranging terms with respect to states for the different Nash equilibria yields
(i): SAt 6= 0, SBt 6= 0
ϕAk kt +ϕ
T




R,tRt + ϕt =
[












βA ϕAAτ1 σforc(f1 + f2 zA − f3 z1−nA )




















Rt + log x
∗
t
+βA ϕAk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + βA ϕAk ) logF(At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t ) + (1 + βA ϕAk )(ξA0 + aA)
+(βA ϕAAτ1 σforc + β
A ϕBAτ1 σforc) f0 + β
AϕTMA ẽt − βAϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
+ βA ϕt+1, (3.37)
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(ii): SAt > 0, SBt = 0
ϕAk kt +ϕ
T




R,tRt + ϕt =
[
















1−n) + βA ϕBAτ1 σforc(f1 + f2 αA z
g

















Rt + log x
∗
t
+βA ϕAk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + βA ϕAk ) logF(At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t ) + (1 + βA ϕAk )(ξA0 + aA)
+(βA ϕAAτ1 σforc + β
A ϕBAτ1 σforc) f0 + β
AϕTMA ẽt − βAϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
+ βA ϕt+1, (3.38)
(iii): SAt = 0, SBt > 0
ϕAk kt +ϕ
T




R,tRt + ϕt =
[
















1−n) + βA ϕBAτ1 σforc(f1 + f2 z
g

















Rt + log x
∗
t
+βA ϕAk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + βA ϕAk ) logF(At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t ) + (1 + βA ϕAk )(ξA0 + aA)
+(βA ϕAAτ1 σforc + β
A ϕBAτ1 σforc) f0 + β
AϕTMA ẽt − βAϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
+ βA ϕt+1. (3.39)
Hence, for all Nash equilibria the controlled dynamics remain linear in states.
B.1.3.4 Shadow values of the states.
Coefficient matching with respect to capital kt yields
ϕAk = (1 + β




Structurally similar to the global model we get the consumption rate x∗t = 1− βA κ.
Coefficient matching with respect to transformed temperatures delivers













for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Note that to preserve symmetry in notation, we defined the corresponding matrix σB by
swapping the first and second rows and columns of the matrix σA.
Region A’s shadow values of atmospheric temperature in regions A and B are therefore
ϕAAτ1 = −ξA0 (1 + βA ϕAk )σ̃A11, and ϕBAτ1 = −ξA0 (1 + βA ϕAk )σ̃A12.
The temperature shadow values for region B follow by switching region indices. We now
define γA ≡ βA ξA0 σ̃A11 σforc, and γheatA ≡ βA ξA0 σ̃A12 σforc (and analogously γB, and γheatB ).
This gives us δ̃A, ãA, and b̃A (which we defined in equations 3.32 to 3.35) as a function of
γA, γheatA , γB, and γ
heat
B :
−δ̃A = (1 + βA ϕAk )(−γA f2 − αA γheatA f2 − dAA)
ãA = (1 + β
A ϕAk )(1− n)γA f3
b̃A = (1 + β
A ϕAk )(1− n)αA γheatA f3
By switching region indices we gain δ̃B, ãB, and b̃B. Thus, zA and zB are also functions





A , γB, γ
heat
B ) =
(δB(γB, γheatB ) bA(γheatA )− aB(γB) δA(γA, γheatA )
bB(γheatB ) bA(γ
heat





B , γA, γ
heat
A ) =
(δA(γA, γheatA ) bB(γheatB )− aA(γA) δB(γB, γheatB )
bA(γheatA ) bB(γ
heat
B )− aA(γA) aB(γB)
)− 1
n
We note that the terms (1 + βA ϕAk ), and (1 + β
B ϕBk ) cancel out and thus
δA = γA f2 + αA γ
heat
A f2 + dAA
118
aA = (1− n)γA f3
bA = (1− n)αA γheatA f3.
The terms δB, aB, and bB are defined analogously.
Coefficient matching with respect to the carbon stocks, and using γA, and γheatA yields




−f2 (γA zA+γheatA zB)−
dAA (zA − αB zB) + αB dBA(zB − αA zA)
1− αA αB











1 (1− βA Φ)−1, (3.40)
(ii): SAt > 0 and SBt = 0
ϕTMA = (1 + β
A ϕAk )
(





















1 (1− βA Φ)−1, (3.41)
(iii): SAt = 0 and SBt > 0
ϕTMA = (1 + β
A ϕAk )
(




































Switching region indices delivers the symmetric result for region B.
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Coefficient matching with respect to the resource stock leads to
ϕTR,t = βϕ
T
R,t+1 ⇔ ϕR,t = β−tϕR,0 (Hotelling’s rule).
The initial resource values ϕTR,0 depend on the set up of the economy, including assump-
tions about production and the energy sector. Given the coefficients and the optimal rate
of consumption equations (3.37), (3.38), and (3.39) turn to the following condition:
ϕt − βA ϕt+1 = log x∗t + βA ϕAk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + βA ϕAk ) logF(At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t )
+ (1 + βA ϕAk )(ξ
A
0 + a
A) + (βA ϕAAτ1 σforc + β





This condition will be satisfied by picking the sequence ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, .... The additional
condition limt→∞(βA)tV (·) = 0⇒ limt→∞(βA)tϕt = 0 pins down this initial value ϕ0.
B.1.3.5 Rest of the world
In the following we show for the rest of the world that the system is linear in states and
that the affine value function




τW τ t +ϕ
T
MW M t +ϕ
T













solves the system. We suppress regional indices when there is no ambiguity to ease no-





τW τ t +ϕ
T










−(dBWSBt + dAW αA SAt )− aW (mt − 1) + λKt (1−
IK∑
i=1














σAτ t + F̃ t
)








First order conditions. The first order conditions for xt,N t,Kt,Et are structurally
the same as in the global model.











k ,ϕMW ,ϕR,t+1) into
the maximized Bellman equation gives us
ϕWk kt +ϕ
T
τW τ t +ϕ
T
MW M t +ϕ
T
R,tRt + ϕt = log x
∗





−(dBWSBt +dAW αA SAt )−aW (mt−1)+βW ϕWk
(
















+ βW ϕt+1 (3.46)
Arranging terms by states for the different Nash equilibria yields
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(i): SAt 6= 0, SBt 6= 0
ϕWk kt +ϕ
T
τW τ t +ϕ
T
MW M t +ϕ
T
R,tRt + ϕt =
[













βW ϕAWτ1 σforc(f1 + f2 zA − f3 z1−nA ) + β
W ϕBWτ1 σforc(f1 + f2 zB − f3 z1−nB )





(zA − αB zB) + dBW
1
1− αA αB











Rt + log x
∗
t + β
W ϕWk log(1− x∗t )
+(1 + βW ϕWk ) logF (At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t ) + (1 + βW ϕWk )(ξW0 + aW )
+f0 β
W (ϕAWτ1 σforc + ϕ
BW
τ1 σforc) + β
W ϕTMW ẽt − βW ϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
+ βW ϕt+1.
with zA ∈ {zcA, z
g
A}, zB ∈ {zcB, z
g
B}, dAA ∈ {dcAA, d
g
AA}, and dBB ∈ {dcBB, d
g
BB} depending
on whether region A and B engage in counter-geoengineering or geoengineering.
(ii): SAt > 0, SBt = 0
ϕWk kt +ϕ
T
τW τ t +ϕ
T
MW M t +ϕ
T
R,tRt + ϕt =
[















τ1 (f1 + f2 z
g
A − f3 (z
g
A)
1−n) + βW σforc ϕ
BW
τ1 (f1 + f2 αA z
g

















Rt + log x
∗
t
+βW ϕWk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + βW ϕWk ) logF (At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t ) + (1 + βW ϕWk )(ξW0 + aW )
+f0 β
W (ϕAWτ1 σforc + ϕ
BW
τ1 σforc) + β




(iii): SAt = 0, SBt > 0
ϕWk kt +ϕ
T
τW τ t +ϕ
T
MW M t +ϕ
T
R,tRt + ϕt =
[















τ1 (f1 + f2 z
g
B − f3 (αB z
g
B)
1−n) + βW σforc ϕ
BW
τ1 (f1 + f2 αA z
g

















Rt + log x
∗
t
+βW ϕWk log(1− x∗t ) + (1 + βW ϕWk ) logF (At, K∗t , N∗t , E∗t ) + (1 + βW ϕWk )(ξW0 + aW )
+f0 β
W (ϕAWτ1 σforc + ϕ
BW
τ1 σforc) + β
W ϕTMW ẽt − βW ϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
+ βW ϕt+1.
Hence, in all Nash equilibria the system is linear in states.
Shadow values of the states. Coefficient matching with respect to capital kt yields
ϕWk = (1 + β
W ϕWk )κ ⇔ ϕWk =
κ
1− βW κ
Structurally similar to the global model we get the consumption rate x∗t = 1− βW κ.
Coefficient matching with respect to transformed temperatures delivers
ϕTτW = −ξW0 (1 + βW ϕWk ) eT1 (1− βW σA)−1.






for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Note that to preserve symmetry in notation, we defined the corresponding matrix σB by
swapping the first and second rows and columns of the matrix σA.
The rest of the world’s shadow values of atmospheric temperature in regions A and B
are therefore
ϕAWτ1 = −ξW0 (1 + βW ϕWk )σ̃W12 , and ϕBWτ1 = −ξW0 (1 + βW ϕWk )σ̃W11 .
Further, we define γheatW ≡ βW ξW0 σ̃W12 σforc and γW ≡ βW ξW0 σ̃W11 σforc.
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Coefficient matching with respect to carbon stocks and using γW , and γheatW yields
(i): SAt 6= 0, SBt 6= 0
ϕWM1 = (1 + β
W ϕWk )
(
− f2(γheatW zA + γW zB)− dAW
αA
1− αA αB

















1 (1− βW Φ)−1 (3.47)
(ii): SAt > 0, SBt = 0





A + γW αA z
g

















1 (1− βW Φ)−1 (3.48)
(iii): SAt = 0, SBt > 0







































From coefficient matching with respect to the resource stock we have
ϕTR,t = β
W ϕTR,t+1 ⇔ ϕR,t = (βW )−tϕR,0 (Hotelling’s rule).
The initial resource values ϕTR,0 depend on the set up of the economy, including assump-
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tions about production and the energy sector. Given the coefficients and the optimal rate
of consumption equations (3.37), (3.38), and (3.39) turn to the following condition:




W )+βW (ϕAWτ1 σforc+ϕ
BW
τ1 σforc) f0+β
W ϕTMW ẽt−βW ϕTR,t+1Edt
∗
(3.51)
This condition will be satisfied by picking the sequence ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, .... The additional
condition limt→∞(βW )tV (·) = 0⇒ limt→∞(βW )tϕt = 0 pins down this initial value ϕ0.
B.1.3.6 Proofs of Propositions 3.3 & 3.7
The proofs make use of section B.1.3.2, where we derive the Markov strategies, section
B.1.3.3, where we show that the strategies are consistent with the assumed linear form
of the trial solution for the Bellman equation, and section B.1.3.4, where we derive the
solutions for the shadow values.
General model (Proposition 3.7). In section B.1.3.2 we show that the following
reaction functions characterize a Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game: If (i) SBt = 0,
region A chooses SAt = z
g
Amt and if (ii) S
B





zgA − αB zB
)





zcA − αB zB
)
for SAt < 0
SAt = 0 otherwise.
If (i) SBt = 0, then
zgA =
(







and if (ii) SBt 6= 0, then
zgA =




 1n , zcA =








A ϕAAτ1 σforc f2 + β
A ϕBAτ1 σforc f2 αA − (1 + βA ϕAk )d
g
AA
−δ̃cA = βA ϕAAτ1 σforc f2 + βA ϕBAτ1 σforc f2 αA − (1 + βA ϕAk )dcAA
ãA = (n− 1)βA ϕAAτ1 σforc f3
b̃A = (n− 1)βA ϕBAτ1 σforc f3 αA.
Swapping region indices characterizes region B’s strategies.
In section B.1.3.4 we show that region A’s shadow values of atmospheric temperatures
in regions A and B are
ϕAAτ1 = −ξA0 (1 + βA ϕAk )σ̃A11, and ϕBAτ1 = −ξA0 (1 + βA ϕAk )σ̃A12.
The temperature shadow values for region B follow by switching region indices.
Defining γA ≡ βA ξA0 σ̃A11 σforc, and γheatA ≡ βA ξA0 σ̃A12 σforc, gives us δA, aA, and bA as
a function of γA, and γheatA :
aA ≡
ãA
(1 + βA ϕAk )
= (1− n)γA f3
bA ≡
b̃A
(1 + βA ϕAk )
= (1− n)αA γheatA f3
δgA ≡
δ̃gA
(1 + βA ϕAk )
= (dgAA + ε
g





(1 + βA ϕAk )
= (dcAA − εcA) + γA f2 + αA γheatA f2.
The solutions for δB, aB, and bB follow by switching region indices. Thus, if (i) SBt = 0
zgA =
(







and if (ii) SBt 6= 0, then
zgA =
(















Swapping region indices characterizes region B’s propensity and reluctance.
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0, simplifies the shadow values of temperature such that ϕAAτ1 = −ξA0 (1 + βA ϕAk ) σ̃A11 and
ϕBAτ1 = 0 since σ̃A12 = 0. For the base model, we use a slightly simpler notation and define
ϕAτ1 ≡ ϕAAτ1 .








(n− 1)βA ϕAτ1 σforc f3
(1 + βA ϕk)d
g










(n− 1)βA ϕAτ1 σforc f3
(1 + βA ϕk)d
c
AA − βAϕAτ1 σforc f2
) 1
n
Switching region indices gives us the analogous result for region B. Using γA = βA ξA0 σ̃A11 σforc,
and noting that γheatA = 0 leads to
zgA =
(
(1− n) f3 γA









(1− n) f3 γA




B.1.3.7 Proof of Proposition 3.4
To derive the Nash equilibria we use the reaction functions for region A and B from
section B.1.3.2. We note that Assumption 3.1 excludes the case that both regions engage
in counter-engineering.





















> 0 ⇒ zgB > αAz
g
A. (3.54)





< α−1A . (3.55)













and f2 for which there exists an equilibrium in which both regions are cooling the world
given γA, γheatA , γB and γ
heat
B .





















< 0 ⇔ zcB < αAz
g
A. (3.56)




> max{αB, α−1A } ⇔ h ≡
zgA
zcB
> α−1A = max{αB, α
−1
A }.
i.c) The case where region A is warming (SAt < 0) and region B is cooling (SBt > 0)
follows by symmetry (switching the region indices)
zgB
zcA
> α−1B = max{αA, α
−1




ii) In the case where region A is cooling (SAt > 0) and region B is not acting (SBt = 0)
it has to be optimal for region B to neither engage in cooling, nor in counter-engineering.
Given region A is taking the same actions as in scenarios i and ii, region B’s reaction
function can neither satisfy equation (3.54) nor (3.56). Therefore, it must be thatH ≥ α−1A
and h ≤ α−1A . In addition, region A’s reaction function becomes
SAt (mt) = z
g
Amt > 0,
which will always be satisfied. The reaction function of region B is obviously SBt = 0.
iii) Finally, the symmetric reasoning for region B cooling (SBt > 0) and region A not
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⇔ Ĥ ≥ αB ≥ H.
Here the reaction functions are
SBt (mt) = z
g
Bmt > 0
and locally SAt = 0. These 5 cases are mutually exclusive and cover the full parameter
domain.
B.1.3.8 Proofs of Propositions 3.5 & 3.8
The proofs make use of the solutions for the shadow values of the atmospheric carbon
stock from section B.1.3.4.
General model (Proposition 3.8). Inserting ϕAk into (3.40), (3.41), and (3.42)
delivers:





− f2 (γA zA + γheatA zB)−
dAA (zA − αB zB) + αB dBA(zB − αA zA)
1− αA αB



































































The regional SCC is the negative of the regional shadow value of atmospheric carbon
expressed in money-measured consumption units. Thus,
(i): SAt 6= 0 and SBt 6= 0









































depending on whether the corresponding region engages in geoengineering (g) or counter-
geoengineering (c).
(ii): SAt > 0 and SBt = 0































(iii): SAt = 0 and SBt > 0



































to Proposition 3.8. Swapping region indices characterizes region B’s SCC.







to zero and thus also γheatA = 0, the general equations (3.57), (3.58), and (3.59) for the
regional SCC turn to


















with zA ∈ {zcA, z
g
A}, zB ∈ {zcB, z
g
B}, dAA ∈ {dcAA + εc, d
g
AA + ε
g}, and dBB ∈ {dcBB +
εc, dgBB + ε
g}.




































B.1.3.9 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The proof makes use of the solutions for the shadow values of the atmospheric carbon
stock from section B.1.3.5.
General model. Inserting ϕWk into (3.47), (3.48), and (3.49) delivers





− f2(γheatW zA + γW zB)− dAW
αA
1− αA αB

























A + γW αA z
g













































The regional SCC is the negative of the regional shadow value of atmospheric carbon
expressed in money-measured consumption units. Thus,
(i): SAt 6= 0 and SBt 6= 0


























with zA ∈ {zcA, z
g
A}, zB ∈ {zcB, z
g
B}, dAW ∈ {dcAW , d
g
AW }, and dBW ∈ {dcBW , d
g
BW }.
(ii): SAt > 0 and SBt = 0





aW + f1 (γ
heat

























(iii): SAt = 0 and SBt > 0





aW + f1 (γ
heat






























B are equal to
zero, γheatW = 0. The general equations (3.60), (3.61), and (3.62) for the SCC in the rest
of the world turn to


















with zA ∈ {zcA, z
g
A}, zB ∈ {zcB, z
g
B}, dAW ∈ {dcAW , d
g
AW }, and dBW ∈ {dcBW , d
g
BW }.






































4 Carbon dioxide removal in a global analytic
climate economy
Felix D. Meier1,2
1Kiel Institute for the World Economy
2German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) Halle-Jena-Leipzig
Abstract: This paper investigates the option of carbon dioxide removal (CDR)
and storage in different reservoir types in an analytic climate-economy model, and
derives implications for optimal mitigation efforts, and CDR deployment. I show
that the introduction of CDR lowers net energy input and net emissions over the
entire time path. Furthermore, CDR affects the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) via
changes in total economic output but leaves the analytic structure of the SCC
unchanged. In the first years after CDR becomes available the SCC is lower and
in later years it is higher compared to a standard climate-economy model. Carbon
dioxide emissions are first higher and then lower relative to a world without CDR.
The quantitative analysis shows that the effect of CDR on the SCC is minor and
only accounts for an increase of 3 USD/tCO2 by the year 2100.
Keywords: carbon dioxide removal, climate change, integrated assessment, social
cost of carbon, optimal carbon tax
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4.1 Introduction
In line with the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to well below 2◦C many
countries have declared their intention to transition towards a net-zero emissions
economy by the second half of this century (Tanaka and O’Neill, 2018). To ac-
complish this goal technologies that remove carbon from the atmosphere or capture
carbon directly from large stationary emission sources, such as power plants, have
been proposed. Subsequently, both technologies require the storage of carbon in
secure geological reservoirs or the ocean (Anderson and Newell, 2004). The process
of capturing, transporting and storing carbon however consumes additional energy
and thus potentially leads to new emissions (IPCC, 2005). Moreover, the availabil-
ity of carbon dioxide removal and storage as an ‘end of pipe’ mitigation technology
may be perceived as a substitute for conventional emission mitigation, which might
lead to rebound effects (e.g. Geden et al., 2019).
I explore these trade-offs in an analytic integrated assessment model where Car-
bon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies can be used to reduce atmospheric carbon
concentrations at a cost measured in energy units. I derive the optimal level of CDR
deployment and analyze how emissions, energy input, and the SCC (optimal carbon
tax) are affected by the introduction of CDR. Although the model focuses on CDR,
it is general enough to also consider the potential of Carbon Capture and Storage
(CCS) technologies.
Atmospheric carbon dioxide only represents a small fraction of the total carbon
stock in the Earth System, namely 829 gigatons (Gt) out of a total of more than
45,696 gigatons (IPCC, 2013). The rest of it is bound in other reservoirs such as
the oceans that have served as an important carbon sink over the past 200 years
(Sabine et al., 2004). Due to the large storage capacity, the ocean has been suggested
to serve as a reservoir for the intentional injection of carbon dioxide via ships or
pipelines (Rickels and Lontzek, 2012).
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Whether a geological reservoir, such as an exploited oil field, is well suited for
CDR is mainly determined by the rate at which carbon leaks back to the atmosphere
(van der Zwaan and Gerlagh, 2009). A similar problem arises, if carbon is stored
in the ocean. Due to feedback and saturation effects in the carbon cycle some
of the carbon that is injected into the oceans will eventually still end up in the
atmosphere. Rickels et al. (2018) investigate how well these effects are captured in
currently used Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). Rickels and Lontzek (2012)
explore the economic implications of the ocean’s imperfect storage property. They
show that optimally each ton of carbon sequestered to the ocean is taxed at a
rate lower than the optimal carbon tax for atmospheric carbon emission. In this
paper, I derive the SCC, which quantifies the optimal tax on carbon emissions, for
different reservoir types and analyze how the optimal carbon tax is affected by the
introduction of CDR technologies by comparing the results of model specifications
with and without the availability of CDR.
The paper is based on the recently emerging literature on analytic IAMs which
have the feature that the SCC can be written as a constant fraction of total economic
output (e.g. Traeger, 2018; Gerlagh and Lsiki, 2018; Golosov et al., 2014). This
result arises from specific assumptions on utility and climate change damages which
ensure that the climate-economy model is linear in the model’s state variables, in
particular human-made capital and the stocks of carbon in the different reservoirs
(Karp, 2017; Traeger, 2018). I show that due to the linear-in-states property of
analytic IAMs the deployment of CDR technologies has no effect on the analytic
structure of the SCC. However, CDR alters the time path of total economic output
and therefore influences the level of the SCC. The quantitative analysis shows that
this effect is minor and only increases the SCC by 3 USD/tCO2 by the year 2100,
where the absolute level of the SCC is around 800 USD/tCO2.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the option of
CDR in an analytic climate-economy model. Section 4.3 presents the theoretical
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results on optimal emissions, CDR deployment, and the SCC, and compares them
to the outcome of a standard climate-economy model without the option of CDR.
The last section provides a numerical simulation for calibrated versions of both
model types.
4.2 Analytic climate-economy model
This section introduces the option of CDR and the storage of carbon in different
reservoirs types in an analytic integrated assessment model of climate change. The
model is based on Traeger (2018) and Golosov et al. (2014). I consider a global
economy where gross output Yt is a function of technology A0,t, capital Kt, labor







t with K0 > 0 given. (4.1)
The subscript zero denotes that technology and labor are prescribed by time de-
pendent exogenous processes. Subscript t denotes the point in time. I distinguish
between gross energy Et and net energy It, whereby only the latter enters the gross
output function.
Energy Et is derived from an exhaustible resource Rt which comprises all fossil
fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas), and is measured in terms of its carbon content (in
GtC). Absent a CCS technology, Et can also be interpreted as carbon emissions.
The resource stock Rt develops over time according to
Rt+1 = Rt − Et, with R0 > 0 given. (4.2)
I follow Traeger (2018) and use the carbon cycle from the DICE model (Nordhaus
and Sztorc, 2013). There are three carbon reservoirs, the atmosphere (M1), the
upper ocean (M2), and the deep ocean (M3). According to IPCC (2013), the current
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amounts are M1 = 830 GtC, M2 = 900 GtC, M3 = 37, 255 GtC. Additionally, I
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or in matrix notation
M t+1 = ΦM t +Et.
The transition matrix Φ shows the rates of carbon flows between the reservoir types.
I assume that the geological reservoir only exchanges with the atmosphere. I set the
carbon flow coefficients φ14, φ24, φ34, φ42, φ43 equal to zero. The decay coefficient
φ41 shows how much carbon leaks from the geological reservoir to the atmosphere.
The persistence of carbon in reservoir M4 is expressed by φ44, and φ41 + φ44 = 1.
Different to Lafforgue et al. (2008), I assume that there exist no capacity constraints
for the geological reservoir.
CDR technologies allow to remove carbon from the atmosphere M1, and to
store it in another reservoir type Mi with i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. The amount of additional
carbon that is stored in each reservoir is measured in GtC and denoted by Gi,t.
Net emissions are given by the difference between the carbon emitted during the
production process and the carbon that is removed from the atmosphere,
Enett = Et −G1,t. (4.4)
In each time period, the sum of carbon injected in all reservoir types must be equal





Gi,t. If Enett > 0, CDR can also be interpreted as carbon capture and
storage. Net negative emissions are only present if Enett < 0.
The total amount of carbon that enters or leaves the atmosphere is given by the
sum of net emissions Enett , and emissions from exogenous processes including land
use change and forestry, which are collected in Eexot and also measured in GtC.
CDR consumes energy. It is therefore convenient to measure its operational
costs fi(Gi,t) in energy units. Thus, net energy input is the result of fossil energy
net the energy used for CDR,




If a storage reservoir is not used, the corresponding costs of CDR are zero, fi(0) = 0.
Marginal costs are assumed to be positive and increasing for all storage units,
f ′i(Gi,t) > 0 and f ′′i (Gi,t) > 0. A reduction in carbon emissions into the atmosphere
can either be achieved by reducing energy input Et directly (mitigation) or by
using CDR (Gi,t). Since the cost for mitigation and CDR deployment can both
be measured in energy units (in GtC), reservoir i will only be used if its cost
(and marginal cost) is lower than the cost (and marginal cost) of mitigation, thus
fi(Gi,t) ≤ Gi,t, and f ′i(Gi,t) ≤ 1. Note that without the option of CDR net energy
input, emissions, and net emissions are equivalent, It = Et = Enett .
A common assumption of analytic IAMs is that climate change damages have
an exponential impact on global output via increases in atmospheric temperature
(above the pre-industrial level). Following Golosov et al. (2014), I assume a direct
mapping of climate change damages from the atmospheric carbon stock M1,t. The
damage function, that shows climate damage as a fraction of gross output, is given
by
Dt(M1,t) = 1− exp [−ξ0 (M1,t −Mpre1 )] , (4.6)
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whereMpre1 denotes the pre-industrial atmospheric carbon concentration, and ξ0 > 0
the climate change damage parameter that scales the marginal climate damage of
atmospheric carbon. Output net climate change damages is therefore given by
Y nett = Yt [1−Dt (M1,t)]. The model does not include any impacts from increasing
carbon concentrations in the ocean (e.g. from ocean acidification).
As most analytic IAMs, I assume full depreciation of capital over the course
of 10 years, the model’s time step. Thus, the economy’s capital stock in the next
period is given as the difference between net output Y nett , and consumption Ct,
Kt+1 = Yt [1−Dt (M1,t)]− Ct (4.7)
= Yt exp [−ξ0 (M1,t −Mpre1 )]− Ct.
The consumption rate is defined as xt = CtY nett , such that 1− xt is the savings rate.
I solve the model for a social planner who maximizes the infinite stream of con-






subject to the constraints imposed by the economy and the climate system, equa-
tions (4.1) to (4.7). The parameter β denotes the utility discount factor.
4.3 Theoretical results
This section presents the results of the climate-economy model, and compares them
to the outcome of an alternative model specification without the option of CDR.
4.3.1 Carbon dioxide removal
Appendix C.1.1 solves the intertemporal optimization problem. It shows that the
optimal rate of consumption is constant over time, x∗t = 1−β κ, and that the shadow
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value of the fossil resource stock, denoted by ϕR,t, monotonically grows over time
according to Hotelling’s (1931) rule, ϕR,t = β−tϕR,0. In the following, I summarize
the results on optimal CDR deployment.






β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 − β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,i
β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 + (1− β κ)β−tϕR,0
)
, (4.9)
where [·]1,1 denotes the first, and [·]1,i denotes the i th element of the first column of
the inverted matrix in square brackets. Note that the inverse of the marginal cost
function is expressed by f ′i
−1 and that [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 > [(1− βΦ)−1]1,i.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.2.
Optimal CDR deployment is a function of constant model parameters, and the
endogenously determined shadow value of the resource stock, which monotonically
grows over time. Since f ′i(Gi,t) is an increasing function, also its inverse f ′i
−1 is
an increasing function. Thus, optimal CDR immediately starts with its maximum
level and then monotonically declines over time.
The interpretation of the carbon dynamics contributions follows Traeger (2018):
The term [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 characterizes the discounted sum of carbon persisting in
and returning to the atmospheric carbon stock in all future periods. The term
[(1− βΦ)−1]1,i characterizes the long-term contribution to the atmospheric carbon
reservoir from carbon that is currently stored in reservoir i.
The numerator in equation (4.9) shows the marginal benefit of the new technol-
ogy. CDR reduces the marginal damage of emissions as it allows to remove carbon
from the atmosphere and store it in a less damaging reservoir i. The denominator
shows the marginal cost of fossil energy. It captures the opportunity cost of the
resource and the marginal damage that it creates.
The magnitude of the benefit from CDR is determined by the difference in the
carbon dynamics contributions of the atmosphere and reservoir i. A decrease in the
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carbon persistence of reservoir i increases its carbon dynamics contribution as more
carbon eventually finds its way into the atmosphere. This decreases the marginal
benefit of CDR, and hence G∗t declines. In contrast, an increase in the climate
change damage parameter ξ0 or an increase in the atmospheric carbon dynamics
contribution [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 raises the marginal damage of emissions and makes
CDR technologies more attractive.
4.3.2 Emissions and energy input
Using the solution for CDR deployment allows to derive the optimal levels for
emissions, and net energy input.
Proposition 4.2. Optimal carbon emissions into the atmosphere are given by
E∗t =
v









with optimal CDR deployment G∗i,t as defined in equation (4.9).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.3.
Optimal emissions are given by the sum of two terms. The first term cap-
tures the marginal benefit (numerator) and the marginal cost (denominator) from
fossil energy. The term monotonically declines over time as the shadow value of
the fossil resource increases. The second term shows the total cost of CDR deploy-
ment (measured in energy units). According to Proposition 4.1 optimal deployment
monotonically declines over time, and thus optimal emissions decline over time as
well.
An increase in ϕR,0 makes the fossil resource a more expensive input for pro-
duction, and decreases both terms in equation (4.10). An increase in the carbon
dynamics contribution [(1− βΦ)−1]1,i increases the marginal damage from reser-
voir i. As a result CDR deployment declines, and thus optimal emissions are lower.
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The outcome of an increase in [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 and ξ0 is ambiguous as there are two
opposing effects. It decreases the first term in equation in (4.10) but leads to a
higher level of CDR which increases the second term.
Using the solutions G∗i,t and E∗t allows to solve for optimal net energy input I∗t ,
I∗t =
v
β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 + (1− β κ)β−tϕR,0
. (4.11)
Net energy is defined as the difference between fossil energy and the energy spent
on CDR. It is therefore equivalent to the first term in equation (4.10). Net energy
input increases in the energy share v, and decreases in climate change damages
ξ0, the initial resource shadow value ϕR,0, and the carbon dynamics contribution
[(1− βΦ)−1]1,1.
In order to gain insides on what changes due to the introduction of CDR, I
specify an alternative scenario by removing the option of CDR from the climate-
economy model in section 4.2. I denote the variables of the alternative model
without CDR by a tilde. In the following, I show that the introduction of CDR
influences the initial shadow value of the nonrenewable resource, and analyze how
this affects net energy input, and net emissions. I discuss the implications of CDR
for E∗t in the subsequent section.
Proposition 4.3. CDR increases the shadow value of the fossil resource, and de-
creases net energy input and net emissions.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.4.
CDR increases the value of the fossil fuel resource as it creates an additional
option to mitigate the negative effects from carbon emissions, and thus reduces the
social costs of using fossil fuels. Due to the linear-in-states property of the model,
there is no direct effect of CDR on the marginal damage of carbon emissions. As a
result, the net effect of CDR on the cost of the fossil resource is positive, and thus
net energy input declines, ∆ I∗t ≡ I∗t − Ĩ∗t < 0.
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Next, I compare how net emissions differ between both model types. The dif-

















since Ĩ∗t > I∗t and fi(G∗i,t) ≤ G∗i,t. CDR leads to lower net emission over the entire
time path. This result is driven by two effects. First, as already shown CDR lowers
net energy input, and second, the cost of CDR is lower than the cost of mitigation
(both measured in energy units).
4.3.3 Social cost of carbon
This section derives the SCC for all reservoir types and explores how CDR influences
the optimal carbon tax. Due to the linear-in-states property of the model the
marginal damage for each reservoir type is independent of its stock size. This leads
to the following result.
Proposition 4.4. CDR leaves the structure of the atmospheric SCC (optimal car-









As defined above, [·]1,i denotes the i th element of the first column of the inverted
matrix in square brackets.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.5.
The persistence of carbon differs between reservoir types such that each reservoir
has its own SCC. For the DICE carbon cycle, the carbon dynamics contribution
of the deep ocean is smaller than the carbon dynamics contribution of the shallow
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ocean. This leads to the following ordering: SCCM1 > SCCM2 > SCCM3. The
carbon dynamics contribution of reservoirM4,t (the geological storage unit) depends
on the decay rate φ41. If it is a secure deposit and the decay rate is zero, then
SCCM4 = 0.
Deriving the atmospheric SCC (optimal carbon tax) for the alternative model
specification without CDR leads to the same result as in equation (4.12). The
availability of CDR leaves the analytic structure of the atmospheric SCC unchanged.
This result is driven by two crucial assumptions of analytic IAMs. First, utility is
a logarithmic function of consumption, and second, climate change damages have
an exponential impact on output. These two assumptions ensure that the climate-
economy model is linear-in-states and can be solved by a linear affine value function
(Karp, 2017). The linear-in-states property implies that the marginal damage from
an additional unit of carbon in the atmosphere is constant and does not depend
on the atmospheric carbon concentration. Hence, removing a unit of carbon from
the atmosphere has no effect on the marginal damage, and the atmospheric SCC.
This is different for other geoengineering measures such as stratospheric aerosol
injections (see Chapter 3).
Next, I analyze how the level of the SCC is affected by the availability of CDR,
compared to the situation without CDR. According to Proposition 4.3 CDR leads
to a lower net energy input over the entire time path. As a result initial output
declines. Since the initial atmospheric carbon concentration and initial climate
change damages are equivalent for both model types, initial net output decreases
as well. This lowers the initial level of the atmospheric SCC, and therefore rises
the level of emissions in the beginning. However, as CDR is an option it must
increase net output eventually as otherwise it would no be used. Thus, there must
exist a period in the future in which the SCC is higher compared to the model
without CDR. The interpretation of this result is straight forward. As climate
change damages are measured in percent of output, an increase in Yt also increases
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the money-measured welfare loss from global warming. In other words: The better
off the economy is, the more the economy loses from climate change. The next
section quantifies this effect.
4.4 Quantitative analysis
This section illustrates the previous theoretical findings. It provides a calibration
of the climate-economy model for a high and low-cost scenario of oceanic CDR, and
compares the results to the alternative model specification without CDR.
4.4.1 Climate-economy model without CDR
The simulation starts in t = 2010 and ends in t = 2200 with one period repre-
senting ten years, which is a standard in the literature. Economic growth is driven
by increasing total factor productivity A0,t, which develops exogenously over time
according to
A0,t = A0 (1 + w)
t. (4.13)
The growth rate of total factor productivity is assumed to be 2 percent per year,
w = 0.02. The initial population is set to 6.9 billion and assumed to grow logistically
over time to a maximum of 11 billion in 2200 as in Gerlagh and Lsiki (2018). Output
for the initial decade is set to 700 trillion (tn) USD. I use the same shares of capital,
α = 0.3, and net energy, v = 0.04, as in Golosov et al. (2014). The utility discount
rate is set to 1.4 percent per year (Traeger, 2018). The given parameter set implies
an optimal constant savings rate of s ≈ 0.25. The initial capital stock is assumed to
be 135 trillion USD, approximately the output of two years, and fully depreciates
over the course of a decade. I use the carbon cycle from DICE 2013 (Nordhaus
and Sztorc, 2013), and the climate change damage parameter ξ0 = 5.3 x 10−5 from
Golosov et al. (2014). The pre-industrial carbon stock is set to 600 GtC. The carbon
concentration for the first decade is set to 830.4 GtC yielding initial climate change
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damages of D0 = 1.2 percent.
Assuming emissions of 86.7 GtC for the first decade (Gerlagh and Lsiki, 2018)
allows to solve for the initial level of total factor productivity, and delivers A0 = 38.
I then calibrate the initial resource stock such that it matches the initial level of
emissions. This implies an initial fossil fuel stock size of 793.25 GtC. Table 4.1
summarizes the model parameters and initial stock values.
Table 4.1: Parameter values
K0 N0 R0 κ v β w A0 ξ0
135 6.9 793.25 0.3 0.04 0.986 0.02 38.02 5.3 x 10−5
trillion USD billion GtC 1/year 1/year 1/GtC
Figure 4.1 shows the outcome of the standard model without CDR. The fossil
resource is scarce and used up over the time horizon. Emissions start at 86 GtC
per decade and monotonically decline over time as the shadow price of the resource
increases. Damages start at 1.2 percent of global output and increase up to around
3 percent by the year 2100. Afterwards, damages start to decline as less energy is
used and more carbon is taken up by the oceans. Relative net production (GDP)
rises over time due to the growth of total factor productivity. The atmospheric SSC
starts at around 45 USD/tCO2 and increases up to around 800 USD/tCO2 by the
year 2100. All these results are very much in line with results of common IAMs
(e.g. Golosov et al., 2014).
4.4.2 Climate-economy model with oceanic CDR
This section introduces the option of oceanic CDR and explores how it affects the
outcome of the standard climate-economy model. Cost estimates for the storage of
carbon in the oceans are still uncertain and vary widely. IPCC (2005) estimates the
cost for oceanic storage between 22 and 114 USD/tC. Rickels et al. (2018) consider
a convex cost function with a broad parameter range for the quadratic cost term to
account for uncertainty about the cost of large-scale deployment.
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Figure 4.1: The graph shows emissions per decade (Ẽt), damages (D̃t), relative
net output (Ỹ nett /Ỹ net0 ), and the social cost of carbon ( ˜SCCt) for the calibrated
standard climate-economy model without CDR.
To capture the cost uncertainty for oceanic CDR I consider a low and high-cost




with parameter gl to be calibrated. As a point of reference, I use the linear quadratic
cost function from Rickels et al. (2018) and combine it with the lower bound cost
estimate for oceanic storage of 22 USD/tC from IPCC (2005), which leads to
F (Gt) = 0.022Gt + 0.01833G
2
t . (4.15)
CDR deployment Gt is measured in GtC and F (Gt) shows the costs in trillion USD
(tn USD). I calibrate the cost function fl(Gt) to equation (4.15) for the initial time
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period. Minimizing the squared difference over the interval Gt ∈ (0, 18.5) yields
gl = 0.056. I choose this interval since for Gt ≥ 18.5 the cost of CDR is higher
than the cost of mitigation. Figure 4.2 shows the quality of the fit, and the cost of
mitigation in trillion USD. For the high-cost scenario, I consider the upper bound
Figure 4.2: The graph shows the calibrated cost function fl(Gt) (solid line), the
cost estimate based on Rickels et al. (2018) and IPCC (2005) (dashed line), and the
cost of mitigation (dotted line).
of previous estimates. As the upper bound cost estimate is expected to surpass the
lower bound cost estimate by a factor of five (IPCC, 2005), I assume gh = 5×gl. Due
to the assumption of a quadratic cost function the level of CDR will still be positive
but considerably lower than in the low-cost scenario. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show how
the results change due to the introduction of CDR. The black solid lines show the
results for the low-cost scenario and the dotted green lines show the outcome for
the high-cost scenario.
The simulation illustrates the analytic results from the previous section. In the
first decade, in the low-cost case around 4.5 GtC are removed from the atmosphere
and stored in the deep ocean. In the high-cost scenario, CDR deployment is consid-
erably lower with only 1 GtC in the first decade. As described in Propositions 4.1
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Figure 4.3: The graph shows the optimal deployment of oceanic CDR (Gt) per
decade and the difference in emissions (∆Et), net energy input (∆ It), and net
emissions (∆Enett ) compared to the outcome of the standard model without CDR
for the low cost (black solid lines), and high cost scenario (green dotted lines).
and 4.2 CDR deployment and emissions monotonically decline over time. In line
with Proposition 4.3, net emissions and net energy input is lower over the entire
time horizon compared to the model without CDR. In both scenarios emissions are
first higher and then lower than in the model without CDR. In the low cost scenario
the difference is more pronounced.
In the low-cost case, CDR reduces the atmospheric carbon concentration by
20 GtC in 2125 and damages are lower by around 0.1 percentage points of output.
Towards the end, the negative effect on the atmospheric carbon concentration and
climate damages wears off as CDR deployment goes to zero and more and more
carbon has cycled back from the oceans. In the high-cost case, the negative effect
on atmospheric carbon is minor and only decreases damages by around 0.01 percent.
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Figure 4.4: The graph shows the difference in atmospheric carbon concentration
(∆M1,t), climate change damages (∆Dt), net output (∆Y nett ), and the social cost
of carbon (∆SCCt) compared to the outcome of the standard model without CDR
for the low cost (black solid lines), and high cost scenario (green dotted lines).
The numerical simulation also allows to assess how strongly net output and the
atmospheric SCC (optimal carbon tax) are affected by the introduction of CDR.
As already discussed in the theoretical part of the paper initial net output declines
as CDR becomes available. Figure 4.4 shows that this effect is rather small. Net
output declines by 0.025 percent in the low-cost scenario. Afterwards, the effect on
net output becomes positive and grows until 2125 to around 0.11 percent. Similar
to net output, the SCC is first lower and then higher. The economy first emits more
and then less. The simulation shows that the effect of CDR on the SCC is minor.
By 2100 the SCC is only higher by 3 USD/tCO2 compared to the model without
CDR.
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4.5 Summary and conclusions
The paper introduces the option of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and storage
in different reservoir types into an analytic climate-economy model and compares
the results to a model variant without CDR. The analytic model shows that the
availability of CDR alters the level of the SCC. However, the quantitative analysis
suggests that this effect is negligible. In the low-cost scenario, CDR increases initial
emissions by around 0.6 GtC, which is equivalent to around 0.7 percent of total
carbon emissions. Thus, with an optimal policy in place the introduction of CDR
has hardly any effect on mitigation incentives. The model suggests that CDR is
needed on top of traditional mitigation efforts.
Furthermore, the paper provides basic implications for the optimal implemen-
tation of CDR technologies. One option that has been proposed in the literature is
the introduction of a differentiated carbon tax (Rickels and Lontzek, 2012). This
paper presents a simple formula for the reservoir specific carbon tax, and character-
izes its components. Another suggestion for the optimal implementation of CDR is
the introduction of carbon credits (Chomitz and Lecocq, 2004; Sedjo and Marland,
2003), for which this paper also offers a simple way to calculate it. Finally, I note
that the current setting does not include renewable energies, which would be an
interesting extension to explore.
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C.1 Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1.1 Solving the linear-in-states model
For the proof of the linear-in-states property I follow Traeger (2018). The consumption






logCt = log xt + logA0,t + κ logKt + (1− κ− v) logN0,t + v log It − ξ0 (M1,t −Mpre1 ).
I transform the optimization problem into its dynamic programming form (Bellman equa-
tion)
V (kt,M t, Rt, t) = max
xt,Et,Gt
{
log xt + logA0,t + κ logKt + (1− κ− v) logN0,t
+ v log It(Et, Gi,t)− ξ0 (M1,t −Mpre1 ) + β V (kt+1,M t+1, Rt+1, t+ 1)
}
,
where kt = logKt with the equation of motion
kt+1 = logA0,t + κ logKt + (1− κ− v) logN0,t + v log It − ξ0 (M1,t −Mpre1 ) + log(1− xt).
(4.16)
To solve the intertemporal optimization problem, I use the following guess for the value
function
V (kt,M t, Rt, t) = ϕk kt +ϕ
T
MM t + ϕR,tRt + ϕt, (4.17)
where ϕ is used to denote the shadow values for the different states, and T denotes the
transpose of a vector of shadow values.
Inserting the trial solution and the next periods states (equations 4.2, 4.3, and 4.16)
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into the Bellman equation delivers
ϕk kt +ϕ
T




log xt+logA0,t+κ kt+(1−κ−v) logN0,t+v log It(Et, Gi,t)−ξ0 (M1,t−Mpre1 )
+β ϕk
(
logA0,t+κ kt+(1−κ−v) logN0,t+v log It(Et, Gi,t)−ξ0 (M1,t−Mpre1 )+log(1−xt)
)
+ βϕTM (ΦM t +Et) + β ϕR,t+1 (Rt − Et) + β ϕt+1
}
. (4.18)






= 0 =⇒ x∗t =
1
1 + β ϕk
. (4.19)
Next, I find the first order condition for CDR deployment for reservoir i
−v(1 + β ϕk)
f ′i(Gi,t)
It
= β(ϕM1 − ϕMi), (4.20)
and the first order condition for emissions
v(1 + β ϕk)
1
It
= β(ϕR,t+1 − ϕM1). (4.21)










where the inverse of the marginal cost function is denoted by f ′i
−1. Summing up CDR











Using (4.22) and solving for optimal emissions yields
E∗t =














First order conditions deliver optimal controls x∗t , E∗t , and G∗i,t which are independent of
the states.











v(1 + β ϕk)
β(ϕR,t+1 − ϕM1)
. (4.24)




MM t + ϕR,tRt + ϕt =
[













t +β ϕk log(1−x∗t )+(1+β ϕk) logA0,t+(1+β ϕk)(1−κ−v) logN0,t








t −G∗1,t)+β ϕM2G∗2,t+β ϕM3G∗3,t
+ β ϕM4G
∗
4,t − β ϕR,t+1E∗t + β ϕt+1. (4.25)
Given the optimal controls the maximized Bellman equation is linear in all states.
Shadow values. Coefficient matching with respect to capital, kt, yields




Inserting ϕk into equation (4.19) yield the optimal consumption rate x∗t = 1− β κ.
I match the coefficients of each state from both sides of the equation, which leads to
ϕTM = −ξ0 (1 + β ϕk) eT1 [1− βΦ]−1




eT1 [1− βΦ]−1 (4.27)
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Coefficient matching with respect to the resource stock yields
ϕR,t = β ϕR,t+1 ⇔ ϕR,t = β−tϕR,0 (Hotelling’s rule). (4.28)
The initial resource values ϕR,0 depend on the set up of the economy, including assump-
tions about production and the energy sector. Given the coefficients and the optimal rate
of consumption equation (4.25) turns to the following condition:
ϕt−β ϕt+1 = log x∗t +β ϕk log(1−x∗t )+(1+β ϕk) logA0,t+(1+β ϕk)(1−κ−v) logN0,t
+ (1 + β ϕk)v log I
∗






t − β ϕR,t+1E∗t
This condition will be satisfied by picking the sequence ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, .... The additional
condition limt→∞ βtV (·) = 0⇒ limt→∞ βtϕt = 0 pins down this initial value ϕ0.
C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
















β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 + (1− β κ)β−tϕR,0
)
, (4.29)
where [·]1,1 denotes the first, and [·]1,i denotes the i th element of the first column of the











C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Inserting the solutions for the shadow values, equations (4.26) to (4.28), into (4.23) yields
E∗t =
v





























C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Consider the climate-economy model from section 4.2 without the option of CDR, and let
the variables of this model specification be denoted by a tilde.
From the first order condition (4.20) it follows that optimal emissions without the
option of CDR are given by
Ẽ∗t =
v
β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 + (1− β κ)β−tϕ̃R,0
. (4.31)
The only endogenous term in equation (4.31) is the initial shadow value of the resource
stock, which is denoted by ϕ̃R,0. In both model specifications, the size of the resource




















β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 + (1− β κ)β−tϕ̃R,0
− v
β ξ0 [(1− βΦ)−1]1,1 + (1− β κ)β−tϕR,0
)
.





i,t) > 0, the left term of the equation
is positive, and thus ϕ̃R,0 < ϕR,0. From this it directly follows that ∆ I∗t ≡ I∗t − Ĩ∗t < 0.

















since Ĩ∗t > I∗t and fi(Gi,t) ≤ G∗i,t.
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C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4
The SCC is the negative of the shadow value of carbon reservoir i expressed in money-
measured consumption units,
SCCMi = −(1− β κ)Y nett ϕMi
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